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ABSTRACT 
In 2005, France and England experienced violent events that emanated from their native-
born Muslim populations.  France experienced massive riots in many cities over a period 
of several weeks in the late fall. Britain was hit by terrorists on 7 July 2005, and an attack 
failed two weeks later on 7/21. Also since 2001, there have been over 200 terrorist 
convictions in Britain, many involving homegrown radicals. The events of 2005 
illustrated the difference between two western European countries that have large Muslim 
populations. In Britain, a small minority of British-born Muslims turned to terrorism; in 
France large numbers of young French-born Muslims rioted. Utilizing social movement 
theory, this thesis argues that there were considerably more political opportunities for 
radicals to act in Britain than in France. This difference in opportunities can be explained 
through national policy and national political culture. Britain had allowed radical groups 
to develop within its borders, while France, based on historical experience, proactively 















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: COMPETING VIEWPOINTS...........................2 
B. METHODOLOGY AND ROADMAP.........................................................10 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF FINDINGS...........................................12 
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS .........................................................................15 
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY ..............................................................15 
B. RADICALIZATION PROCESS ..................................................................21 
III. BRITAIN ....................................................................................................................27 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ..............................................................................27 
B. BRITISH MUSLIM CONDITIONS ............................................................28 
C. MUHAJIROUN MOVEMENT ....................................................................32 
D. 7/7 BOMBERS ...............................................................................................36 
E. 7/21 BOMBERS .............................................................................................41 
F. TRANSATLANTIC BOMBING PLOT ......................................................43 
G. BRITISH COUNTERTERRORISM ...........................................................47 
H. CHAPTER CONCLUSION..........................................................................50 
IV. FRANCE.....................................................................................................................53 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ..............................................................................53 
B. FRENCH MUSLIM CONDITIONS............................................................54 
C. UNION DES ORGANISATIONS ISLAMIQUES DE FRANCE 
(UNION OF ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS OF FRANCE).....................57 
D. 2005 RIOTS ....................................................................................................60 
E. FRENCH COUNTERTERRORISM...........................................................62 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION..........................................................................64 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................67 
A. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................67 
B. POLICY IMPLICATION.............................................................................71 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY ..................................................................72 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................81 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my wife for providing me the inspiration, time, and constant 
support to finish this thesis. I would also like to thank my son, Elliott, for providing his 
dad with the needed smiles when the days dragged on and my eyes hurt from all the 
reading. His ability to smile no matter what is going on is an example we should all 
follow.  
I would also like to thank Professors Hafez and Siegel who provided me the much 
needed guidance and advice in drafting this thesis. Their patience and advice went above 
and beyond the call of duty. They helped bring a vague idea into a concrete thesis. For 
this, I am extremely grateful. 
 x




In 2005, France and England experienced symbolic events with respect to their 
native-born Muslim populations.  France experienced massive riots in many cities over a 
period of several weeks in the late fall.  Britain was hit by terrorists on 7 July 2005 
(hereafter 7/7) and an attack failed two weeks later on 7/21.  Also since 2001, there have 
been over 200 terrorist convictions in Britain.1  The events of 2005 illustrated the 
difference between two western European countries that have large Muslim populations. 
In Britain, a small minority of British-born Muslims turned to terrorism; in France large 
numbers of young French-born Muslims rioted.  What accounts for the difference in 
outcomes between the two countries?  
England and France share many similar traits that make the difference in the 
actions of their respective Muslim population all the more interesting.  France has about 
65 million people, while Britain has about 61 million.  Both countries are liberal 
democracies with constitutional protections for religious minorities.2  Both countries 
have large Muslim populations.  France has five million Muslims, which equates to about 
10 percent of the population.  Britain has about two million Muslims, which is about 3 
percent of the population.  In both, the majority of Muslim population arrived from 
former colonies in the 1960s and 1970s, mainly for economic reasons.3  
Given the considerable similarities between Britain and France, what explains the 
different actions on the part of their respective Muslim populations during the past ten  
years?  Why did one country’s Muslim population have a small minority turn to 
terrorism, while another had many turn to social unrest?  What accounts for this 
difference?  
                                                 
1 Michael Emerson. “Introduction and Summary,” in Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies 
of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communites, edited by Michael Emerson, 1--10, (Brussels: Centre 
for European Policy Studies, 2009) 8. 
2 France has a strict church state separation. Britain has no constitutional protection for religious rights 
and even has a nominal state church in the form of the Anglican Church, yet its common law tradition 
provides much of this protection. Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, 
France, and Germany. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 16. 
3 Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 16. 
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A. MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: COMPETING VIEWPOINTS 
There are competing viewpoints when it comes to the sources of Muslim 
radicalism in Europe.  One viewpoint is that the radicalism within Europe is due to 
external sources emanating from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as host nation 
foreign policies. Those who subscribe to this view believe that conflicts such as the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq fuel Muslim anger and resentment.  
Another view holds that the problem is cultural.  In other words, Islam simply is not 
compatible with modern Western society and this incompatibility is what generates the 
radicalism amongst the Muslim population in Europe.  Others feel that there are internal 
grievances within Europe that drive European Muslim anger.  These grievances are 
generated from the relatively poor social and economic position of many Muslims in 
Europe.  Finally, there are those who believe that the radicalism in Europe can best be 
explained through the paradigm of social movement theory that explores the intersection 
among collective grievances, political opportunities for action, mobilizing networks, and 
ideological frameworks.  This study investigates these perspectives on Muslim 
radicalization in the cases of Britain and France.  
Large numbers of Muslims began arriving in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. 
They came primarily for economic reasons to take advantage of the post-war labor 
shortage. These Muslims were primarily single men and they were not expected to stay in 
Europe.4 Yet when economic recession hit in the 1970s, many European states began to 
close their borders to further immigration.  European states closed their borders to further 
low skilled workers but allowed for the possibility of family reunions and political 
asylum. This had the ironic effect of creating a second wave of immigration during the 
1970s as families were united.5 
Instead of being primarily concerned with political and economic rights as 
immigrants, Muslims began to be concerned with social issues as families were united.6 
                                                 
4 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 5. 
5 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 3. 
6 Ibid.. 
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This concern developed as they settled permanently in Europe. European governments 
suddenly had to contend with how to accommodate their Muslim populations.  What 
religious accommodations should be made regarding education, prison and hospital 
services?  How should discrimination be handled?  
For decades, European governments were able to ignore their burgeoning Muslim 
populations, but in the 1970s were forced to recognize the need for change and 
accommodation.  Muslims in Europe became a new interest group and European 
governments had to adjust to the unique challenge that Muslim populations, as well as 
Islamic political groups, posed for their political systems.7  While the various forms of 
political Islam have their roots in the Middle East and South Asia, Muslim migrants 
adapted these ideas to the European continent. 
The suppression of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa drove 
many Islamic radicals to Europe. Many came from Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Morocco as their Islamic parties and groups were persecuted.  It was these 
“radicals” that formed the roots of militant Islam in Europe.8  Most settled in the UK, 
France and Germany.  They saw Europe as a place of refuge until they could foster 
change in their own country.  A small minority would foster radicalism among the 
population within their host country.  
The more militant Sunni Islamists were heavily influenced by Sayyid Qutb. 
Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian radical Islamist who is widely credited with giving 
intellectual heft to radical Islamist ideas, in the 1960s.  He gave voice to the politics of 
despair by offering a religious theory for how to counter it.9  Qutb’s political manifesto 
“Milestones” stated that Muslims faced a critical choice between participating in a 
secular political system, and thereby tacitly accepting its ungodliness, or separating 
and/or resisting.  The leaders of a Muslim revolutionary vanguard would resist ungodly, 
or un-Islamic leaders and systems, with physical force and Jihad.  The goal was to make 
                                                 
7 Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, 3. 
8 Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 6. 
9 Ibid., 8. 
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an Islamic society where no man was the subject of another.10  The revolutionary 
vanguard would transform the corrupt, secular regimes of the Muslim world and make 
them more Islamic.  This goal became very possible in the eyes of many after the 1979 
revolution in Iran.  
To be sure, Islamic activism was present in Europe as the Muslim population 
grew in the 50s and 60s.  As the European Muslim population grew, there were more 
calls for accommodation, which often met with native resistance.11  It was the 1979 
Iranian revolution that sparked an Islamic revival in Europe.12  Although the revolution in 
Iran was a Shia Muslim revolution, many Sunnis saw that Islamic law could influence, 
and even govern a country.  This, in turn, led many Sunni Islam states to engage an 
ideological battle that extended to Europe. 
This revival was spearheaded by states such as Saudi Arabia, which felt 
threatened by the example set in Iran, augmenting the historical enmity between the two 
states.  Sunni states would compete for influence in Europe through the building of 
mosques.  For example, in Britain, there were 51 registered mosques in 1979; in 1985, 
there were 329.  In France, the number of mosques rose from 136 to 766 during the same 
period.13  
 This competition for the hearts and minds of the Muslim community from within 
was to also taint relations with their host countries.  As Pageter states, “The vast majority 
of Muslims in Europe had no interest in the radical groups.  Many saw Islam as a mere 
religion, as something that they did on set occasions but not as a way of life.”14  Yet the 
Salmon Rushdie affair was to change this for many. 
                                                 
10 This entire paragraph is largely taken from Chapter 3 of Milestones. It is important also to note that 
Al Qaeda’s main theorist, Al Zawahiri, was taught by Sayyid’s brother Mohammad. Thus, Al Qaeda’s 
ideology can be seen as an outgrowth of the Islamist view advocated by Qutb. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, 
(1964), 34–39.   
11 Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, 8.  
12 Pageter, New Frontiers of Jihad, 17. 
13 Ibid., 20. 
14 Pageter, New Frontiers of Jihad, 52. 
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 The Salmon Rushdie affair is a good example of how politically motivated 
Islamic groups sought to mobilize Muslims in Europe.  In 1988 Salmon Rushdie, 
authored The Satanic Verses, a novel that offended many Muslims.  Yet little 
spontaneous reaction took place within Europe.15  Instead, many Islamic political groups 
exploited the controversy over the book to enhance their own credentials as defenders of 
the British Muslim community.16  They sought to stir up Muslim protests and call for the 
books banning, among other things.  It was noted by one commentator at the time that 
many of the protests were joined by young British Muslims who were not particularly 
religious, just dissatisfied with their socio-economic position in Britain.17  In 1989, 
Ayatollah Khomeini sought to insert himself into the controversy by issuing a death 
sentence in absentia for Rushdie.  This competition for the Muslim political vote, as it 
were, led many in Europe to question this growing minority’s dedication to liberal, 
Western values.18  
The reaction set off by the Rushdie affair and other controversies regarding the 
integration of Islam into European society continues to this day.  Sheffer argues that the 
increasing alienation of diaspora communities, political agitation by groups who seek to 
take advantage of various integration controversies, and strong ties to the home country 
contribute to diaspora terrorism.19  Indeed, one of the most important characteristic of 
diaspora terrorism is the renewed significance of ethnic identity, which can be enhanced 
when there are also religious differences.20  Juergensmeyer also points out that when 
religion becomes involved, as it has in the case of the integration of Muslims in Europe, 
the issue becomes one of defending ones basic identity.21  Therefore, even when one 
identifies as a Muslim, among other sources of identification (i.e., British, father, son, 
                                                 
15 Pageter, New Frontiers of Jihad, 25–26. 
16 Ibid., 25. 
17 K. Malik, “Born in Bradford,” Prospect, October 2005. 
18 Klausen, The Islamic Challenge,  6–7. 
19 Gabriel Sheffer, “Diasporas and Terrorism,” In The Roots of Terrorism, edited by Louise 
Richardson, 117–132, (New York: Taylor and Francis, LLC, 2006). 
20 Ibid., 125. 
21 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 164. 
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etc.), a perceived attack on that identity can result in a desire to identify more strongly 
with that identity and to defend oneself against such attacks.  This was the dynamic at 
play in the Rushdie affair.  This battle continues today as new controversies arise over 
such things as honor killings, marriage law, and freedom to wear the veil.  
Thus, the problems of economic inequality and difficulties with integration have 
been utilized by Islamic leaders in Europe as well as so-called native Europeans to 
mobilize their constituencies to their political causes, as was alluded to in the Rushdie 
affair.  So-called native Europeans exploit the difficulties with integration to foster more 
nativist policies like restrictions on immigration and less accommodation for minorities. 
The problems within the Muslim community do not arise from Islam per se.  As Roy 
states, associating violence with Islam in Europe just because those committing the 
violence happened to be Muslim is wrong.  Instead, it is more appropriate to classify the 
terrorism within the Muslim community as arising from more traditional forms of youth 
violence.22  This means that Islam today is similar to leftist politics in the 1960s.  Islam 
just happens to be the one common factor amongst the many disaffected youth, who 
largely remain apolitical, with only a few becoming politically agitated enough to engage 
in terrorism, according to Roy. 
As Sageman points out, young militants in Europe do not compare themselves to 
those back in the old country.  Their comparison, and subsequent source of discontent, is 
with their host country.23  In other words, even though some political agitation may be 
fostered by outside groups, local issues are the main driver for conflict and mobilization 
for militant Muslims in Europe.  Some authors, such as Cesari, argue that because 
political Islam started in the Middle East, it cannot be separated from conflicts there.24  
The problem with Cesari’s analysis is that it attributes wholly outside motives to groups 
within Europe that may be sponsored from the outside. In other words, a group may 
                                                 
22 Olivier Roy, “Al-Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative.” in Ethno 
Religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities, edited by 
Michael Emerson, 11–26, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009), 11. 
23 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 83. 
24 Jocelyne Cesari, “The Securitization of Islam in Europe.” Euro-Islam.Info. April 2009. www.euro-
islam.info/2009/05/11/the-securitization-of-islam-in-europe (accessed May 31, 2009). 
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utilize wholly local political opportunities, and concerns to mobilize local Muslims, even 
though the mobilizing group may have outside ties to countries such as Saudi Arabia.  
Cesari is right to point out that outside groups may seek to shape and mold local 
movements.  Yet, the predominant form of organization among European Islamic radicals 
is local.25 
While the political mobilization of European Muslims was fostered by the 
political Islam imitating from the Middle East, it is today dominated by local groups. 
These groups seek to mobilize European Muslims to support a particular cause.  
Therefore, the view that the source of Muslim radicalism in Europe is due to conflicts in 
the Middle East is only partially correct.  It is important to look at the possibility that 
Muslim radicalism, if not wholly due to conflicts in the Middle East, could have 
something to do with Islam itself. 
 The view that Islam is one of the main drivers of Muslim violence, if not its sole 
source, is rooted in the fundamental clash between Islam and Western society.  This 
“clash of civilizations” theme is symptomatic of a culturalist point of view.26  This view 
holds that Islam represents a closed set of beliefs, values contained within a common 
area, society, and history.  Islam is seen as a unitary concept that can explain almost 
anything related to Muslims in almost any context.  This concept confuses religion with 
culture and does not recognize that values and practices are constantly in flux.  Thus, 
somehow Islam is seen as a coherent whole that is incompatible with the West.  It is 
important to note also that in many cases Islamic Fundamentalists to justify their own 
practices and beliefs through the idea of a clash of civilizations.  They too believe that 
Islam is incompatible with the West and is in conflict with the West. 
 If this essentialist point of view were to carry any weight, then the reason radical 
movements thrive in Britain rather than in France has to do with the respective Muslim 
                                                 
25 Edwin Bakker, Jihadi terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which 
They Joined the Jihad: an Exploratory Study, Report, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations, 2006), 33. 
26 Olivier Roy provides a good overview of the arguments against the culturalist point of view, 
especially by the likes of Bernard Lewis and other Orientalists. Samuel Huntington “The Clash of 
Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. Olivier Roy, “Globalized Islam: The Search for a New 
Ummah” (New York: Columbia University Press), 9–10. 
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population’s historical relationship with Islam. This can partially explain the differences 
as the Muslims in each country migrated from countries whose populations had differing 
outlooks when it came to the role of Islam in society.  British Muslims largely migrated 
from South Asia and take a much more traditional view of Islam, while French Muslims 
came largely from North Africa and take a more secular view of Islam’s role in society.27  
This is only one possible reason, however, and the reasons for the differing levels of 
radicalization are varied and complicated, but primarily related to the political, not the 
religious.  This is especially true when it comes to European Muslim elite discourse. 
 The current European Muslim elite discourse often revolves around what level of 
integration or assimilation should take place.  Klausen outlines four main themes in this 
respect: secular integrationalist, Anticlerical, Volunteerist, and Neo-Orthodox. 28  Those 
Muslim leaders that think Islam can be integrated into Western society as a mainstream 
religion are the secular integrationalists.  Those Muslims that feel that Islam is 
compatible with Western society but do not want such integration to be institutionalized, 
such as national Islamic organizations or representative bodies, are the volunteerists, or 
Euro-Muslims.  They see Islam as primarily a secondary identity and would prefer 
religion remain a private matter.  Those that feel that feel that Islam in incompatible and 
do not want to be assimilated are the Neo-Orthodox.  Finally, those that feel that Islam is 
incompatible with Western norms but favor assimilation are the Anti-clericals. 
 These various views show that Muslims in Europe differ greatly in their politics. 
Some, like the Anticlericals and the Neo-Orthodox hold to an essentialist view of Islam, 
but differ as to what this means with respect to state relations.  This difference in views is 
a reflection of personal belief as well as a reflection of the nature of church state 
relations.  Societies like the Dutch and British that favor a separation of church and state 
see high levels of support for Neo-Orthodox and Volunteerist viewpoints, while countries 
with a strict secular government like France see high levels of support for secular 
integrationalist views.29  Thus, it should be clear that as there is no single viewpoint 
                                                 
27 Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, 95; Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 77.  
28 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 87. 
29 Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, 95. 
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regarding what it means to be a Muslim in Europe, the various viewpoints are also shaped 
by the respective national political cultures.  European Muslim utilize and are shaped by 
the opportunities present in their given society, which is what social movement theory 
would predict, as will be shown below. 
Social movement theory, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter, incorporates many of the arguments that were found to explain only part of the 
issues related to Muslim radicalism in Europe.  Social movement theory holds that 
political opportunities shape the mobilization of aggrieved people based on a theme or set 
of themes that resonate with the aggrieved citizens.  Social movement theory is careful to 
point out that grievances are only one factor among many.  Grievances are simply not 
sufficient for people to become mobilized on a consistent basis.  The Rushdie affair 
above is a good illustration of this point.  Many Muslims were offended but no 
spontaneous reaction took place.  It took political groups to recognize political 
opportunities available in the Rushdie affair to organize Muslims in mass political action.  
If grievances alone were sufficient, then those who hold that Islam is incompatible with 
the West and that conflicts in the Middle East drive much of the Muslim radicalism in 
Europe would have a much better case and there would be spontaneous protests against 
such alleged affronts to Muslim dignity as the Satanic Verses.  Instead, political 
organizations had to mobilize people using other themes, beside the alleged affront to 
Muslim dignity.  Indeed social movement theory also accounts for how Islam can be used 
as a motivating factor.  In this respect, it does account for Islam playing a role in the 
radicalization of European Muslims.  The redemptive and reformative themes of religion, 
in this case Islam, are a powerful theme that can unite and mobilize people, provided 
these themes resonate with people personally.  
Social movement theory therefore is a much better frame for determining what 
may lie behind the differences between British and French Muslim populations.  It 
incorporates many of the elements of the other theories into a coherent, dynamic whole.  




opportunity and resources for organizing exists in a much greater degree in British 
Muslims than it does in French Muslims.  This accounts for the difference in mobilization 
outcomes between the two countries. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND ROADMAP 
This thesis will compare Britain and France to show that social movement theory 
can partially explain the presence of terrorism in Britain and the lack of it in France over 
the last few years.  Yet other factors such as foreign policy, counterterrorism policies and 
structures play a role too.  There are differing levels of political opportunity and radical 
mobilization in each country, with Britain having a much larger radical Islamist presence.  
It is this larger presence of radical organizations in Britain that can mobilize British 
Muslims by using the themes of militant Islam.  The same structures do not exist in 
France.  Nor does the French government allow such organizations the political space in 
which to operate. 
This thesis will analyze social and economic statistics of both countries to 
determine, if any, possible causes for the differing reactions among the populations.  This 
will be done through the utilization of social movement theory.  Each country will be 
viewed through the lens of social movement theory in order to show that the conditions 
for the development of terrorism were more prevalent in Britain. 
Chapter II will discuss the theoretical tenants of social movement theory, 
specifically, and most especially, political opportunity structures.  This discussion will 
highlight how political opportunities often are what give radical organizations the space 
with which to conduct their operations.  These organizations also must be structured in 
such a way that they can take advantage of those opportunities.  The discussion will then 
turn to the relation between organizations and individuals as seen through the 
radicalization process.  It is the radicalization process that turns an individual from a law-
abiding citizen to one who is willing to engage in violence for the sake of a political 
cause.  While there is no single path to becoming radicalized, it is important to see the 
broad outlines of the various processes in order to see the key role organizations can play 
in such a process. 
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Chapter III  will discuss the socio-economic situation of British Muslims to 
determine what the factors were that lead so many British Muslims to turn to terrorism.  
The data will show that the opportunities for political protest and potential political 
violence existed in Britain.  The views of Muslims within the British Muslim community 
will be analyzed to show that the terrorists were rogue actors but they were also part of a 
larger dissatisfaction within the British Muslim community.  This will be conducted 
using Rand Corporation’s data on Muslim views, Pew Center data on Muslim views, and 
the recently released Gallup Coexist 2009 poll of Muslim attitudes in Britain, France and 
Germany.30  
This data will be used, in combination with detailed case studies of the terrorist 
cells that perpetuated the 2005 attacks and the attempted transatlantic bombing plot, to 
determine what the primary motivators were for their turn to violence.  The case studies 
will be conducted by using press accounts, interviews of suspects available in the press, 
and government and private analysis of the events.   These case studies will show that the 
terrorists came from the discontented masses of British Muslims.  They were partially 
motivated by the international Jihadist narrative.31  The data will furthermore show that it 
was the presence of radical groups, as well as the unique political opportunities present in 
Britain as a result of its political system and foreign policy during the last few years, that 
fostered the development of terrorism. 
Chapter IV will discuss France and its Muslim population.  The data on French 
Muslims presents a difficult problem.  The French government does not keep detailed 
data on its minority populations as a matter of policy, in order to contribute to integration.  
Yet some analysts have done some work on French Muslims, which will be useful.32  The 
available French government data will be combined with the data on Muslim views from 
                                                 
30 David Aaron In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad  (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 
2008); Gallup-The Coexist Foundation, Muslim West Facts Project. The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A 
Global Study of Interfaith Relations. Poll, (Washington, D.C.: Gallup, 2009); and, The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other. Pew Research Center 
Project, (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center, 2006). 
31Roy, Globalized Islam, 24. 
 32 Justin Vaisse, Unrest in France, November 2005: Immigration, Islam, and the Challenge of 
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the Gallup poll discussed above. This social data will be combined with press accounts of 
the views of the French Muslim rioters, as well as interviews conducted by various 
scholars, to determine the overall views of French Muslims with respect to French 
society. 
The French data will show that the reason France has not seen the level of 
terrorist violence that England has since 2000 is that the political opportunities and 
organizational factors were just not present in France.  While French Muslims do 
consistently rank far below their ostensibly native counterparts in almost every socio-
economic measure available, and experience high levels of discrimination, the political 
opportunities and space for radicals to operate does not exist to the degree it does in 
Britain.  The riots in France were a result of socio-economic discontent and not the result 
of violent political agenda.  Additionally, the French state has been extremely proactive 
with respect to monitoring and deterring radical groups. 
Finally, the thesis will conclude in Chapter V with an overview of the arguments 
presented in this paper.  Then, Chapter V will discuss the ramifications of organizations 
presenting the salient difference between Britain and France.  Because discontent exists 
within any society, and the narrative presented by international Jihadist organizations like 
Al Qaeda are available to anyone with an internet connection, it is important for nations 
to focus on careful targeting of the organizations capable of motivating action.  The 
French example shows that the state can play a significant role in deterring and 
countering radical groups by reducing political opportunities and proactively monitoring 
and deterring radical elements within a given population. 
Thus, there is no reason to think that Islam is the primary factor in modern 
terrorism in Europe or in other locations.  More often than not terrorism is the result of 
political opportunities and the presence of organizations capable of radicalizing masses of 
discontented Muslims.  Islam is incidental to the discussion.  
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF FINDINGS 
This paper will cover the general pattern of political opportunities and 
mobilization routes taken within Britain and France as they relate to Muslims within each 
country.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss or address the various strains of 
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political Islam in any specific detail.  Although it is true that a specific ideology can play 
a role, it is incidental to the claim of this thesis.  Militant Islam is treated as a framing 
device, which may or may not have resonance with a given Muslim population.  This 
thesis is also limited by secondary or tertiary research.  The opportunity to conduct 
primary research did not exist for this thesis.  Thus, this paper is constrained by those 
limitations that are commonly experienced by papers utilizing secondary and tertiary 
sources.  Every effort was made to address obvious and not so obvious bias in sources.  
 14
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II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
 Generally speaking, terrorism experts agree that terrorism is the result of group 
processes and not the result of individual pathologies.  However irrational terrorist 
behavior may appear to others, it has generally been agreed that pathology is not the 
explanation for terrorist behavior; psychology may help explain one terrorists actions but 
not another’s.33  In other words, the individual profiles of terrorists vary so much that 
there can be no overarching psychological theory for terrorist motivation.  Individual-
level explanations, especially psychological explanations for terrorism, have generally 
been discounted by experts such as Horgan, Della Porta and Victoroff, among others.34  
As Victoroff repeatedly points out in his critique of psychological explanations, it is not 
that psychology does not potentially offer insights into motivating terrorist behavior, it 
just that there is to date little evidence to indicate that it does. 35  In other words, the 
utility of individual and psychological explanations for terrorism is extremely limited. 
The research is neither deep nor broad enough.  Thus, it is important to turn to group 
processes and psychology for likely explanations for terrorist’s motivations. 
When considering the group processes that terrorist experts utilize, it is especially 
useful to use social movement theory as a way to consider how people become motivated 
to engage in terrorism.  As Tilly points out, terrorism is often the byproduct of other 
social movements.36  Roy argues that the types of Muslim terrorism seen in Europe can 
best be considered a form of dissent and therefore related to other social movements, 
                                                 
33 Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism.” In The Roots of Terrorism, edited by 
Louise Richardson, 17–28 (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, 2006), 615. 
34 Donatella Della Porta, “Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political 
Organizations.” In Social Movements and Violence. Participation in Underground Organizations, edited by 
Donatella Della Porta (London: Elsevier, 1992); John Horgan. The Psychology of Terrorism (New York: 
Routledge, 2005); and, Jeff Victoroff,  “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological 
Approaches.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (February 2005), 3–42. 
35 Victoroff,  “The Mind of the Terrorist,” 3–42. 
36 Charles Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists.” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1, Theories of Terrorism: 
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especially social revolutionary movements of the left.37  Ross also points out that 
terrorism can result from organizational splits; one group may believe that violence may 
be the only way to reach group goals.38  Crenshaw agrees with Ross and points out that 
terrorist groups share many characteristics of other social movement groups.39  Thus, it is 
clear that in many ways terrorism can be considered a form of social movement.  
The leading proponents of social movement theory argue that the key to 
understanding why social movements develop are three main factors: political 
opportunities, mobilization structures, and framing processes.40  Social movement 
theorists do not deny the powerful role of collective grievances, but they insist that 
grievances alone are not sufficient to explain social mobilization.  It is instead the 
interactions between these three main factors are what shape and mold political 
movements.   
Political opportunities are rules set up by the governing system, levels of 
discontent, economics, social conditions, etc. within a country.  As Tarrow puts it, 
political opportunities are those consistent, but not necessarily permanent aspects of the 
political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
effecting their expectations of success or failure.41  Political opportunities are those 
things within a country that both encourage and restrict the development of social 
movements.  In other words, political opportunities are the rules of the game, external to 
the social movement.42  Thus, a proportional representation system would demand far 
less organization on behalf of a minority group if its only goal were to be represented. 
                                                 
37 Olivier Roy, “Al-Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement,” 11–21. 
38 Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model.” 
Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (August 1993), 317–329. 
39 Martha Crenshaw. “An Organizational Approach to the Study of Terrorism.” Orbis (Fall 1985: 465–
485), 466. 
40 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Framing Processes - Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements,” 
In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing  Structures, and 
Cultural Framings, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 1–22 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
41 Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85. 
42 Ibid., 77. 
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Likewise, a national system, wherein parties compete nationally, rather than locally, such 
as that in France, would demand much more dedicated organizing to even be heard at the 
national level.   
Theorists that focus on political opportunity highlight five main dimensions of 
political opportunity, as it relates to social movements: (1) opening of access to 
participation for new actors; (2) evidence of political realignment within society; (3) the 
appearance of influential allies; (4) emerging splits within the elite; (5) a decline in the 
state’s capacity or will to repress dissent.43  Greater access is usually related to a partial 
opening, as citizens with no political access or full are unlikely to have incentives to 
act.44 Thus, in Europe, Muslims who experience partial recognition of their religious 
rights, or demands for equity in relation to other societal groups, like Jews, such as in 
Britain, are more likely to see an opportunity to gain more, whereas in states that deny 
any place for religion in politics, such as France, reduce the opportunity for Muslim 
groups to mobilize against the state.   
Evidence of shifting alignments provides opportunities through the increased 
importance of certain elements of governing coalitions.  Tarrow uses the example of how 
the increased importance of Democratic Party “inclusionists” created the opportunity for 
the Kennedy Administration to seize the initiative on the black civil rights movement.45 
This was due to the defection of many Southern White voters to the Republican Party in 
the 1950s.  This shift in power created the opportunity for the black civil rights 
movement because they saw the opportunity of national support in the form of the 
Democratic Party. 
Divided elites provide an explicit opportunity for emerging movements.  This 
factor is closely related to a decreased will to repress as divided elites can seek the 
support of groups seeking change.  Groups previously repressed or denied access can 
suddenly find their fortunes change as a division within the elite can provide them with 
                                                 
43 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 76. 
44 Ibid., 77. 
45 Ibid., 78. 
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the opportunity they seek.  With respect to this particular study, opportunities can result 
when elites are divided as to the best way to accommodate Muslim minorities. 
Influential allies can also play a large role in the success or failure of a social 
movement.  Established religious groups can provide support to emergent religious 
groups because they see common cause in issues of values and religion in public life. 
Likewise, as Roy argues, some Muslim groups can find support in radical left 
organizations as they both seek to challenge the ruling establishment.46  
The arrangement of the state and its repressive capacity can greatly influence the 
course of challengers.  As was pointed out earlier, a strong centralized state will 
encourage challengers to mobilize nationally, while a federal state can encourage 
mobilization at the local level, as a federal system provides multiple targets at the base.47 
Yet this is not the entirety of the issue, because structure does not explain how a 
centralized or federal state accommodates challenges.  As Fetzer and Soper point out in 
their study of Muslims and the state, it is the historical pattern of church-state relations 
that explains much of Britain and Frances’ reactions to the demands of their respective 
Muslim minorities.48  Indeed some of the nature of accommodation and willingness to 
repress or include movements is highly contingent on the politics of the day.49 
Mobilizing structures are those collective vehicles, informal and formal, through 
which people mobilize and engage in collective action.50  If no collective vehicles exist to 
take advantage of the political opportunities, little action will take place.  For example, in 
a democratic country groups of people may have ample access to affect change in the 
political system but are unable to because there is no organization capable of harnessing 
this desire to change.  The opportunities exist but the capabilities do not.  
                                                 
46 Roy, Globalized Islam, 46–49.  
47 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 81. 
48 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 18–19. 
49 Tarrow, Power in Movement,  83. 
50 Adam, McCarthy and Zald, “Introduction,” 1–22. 
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A prime example of mobilizing structures at work is the black church during the 
civil rights movement in the United States.   As Morris points out, the black church was 
the dominant institution within black society.  The church provided the organizational 
framework for most of the economic, political and educational endeavors of black 
society, prior to, and during the civil rights movement.51  The black church provided 
social and economic services that were largely denied to blacks prior to the civil rights 
movement.  Through this structure, blacks were able to mobilize and provide the 
institutional and moral support the civil rights movement.  The church provided a 
common organizing principle that allowed the civil rights movement to mobilize masses 
of blacks throughout the American south.  Without this organization, the grievances of 
American blacks may not have been sufficient to mobilize blacks for change. 
Similarly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was built around Shia religious 
structures.  The origins of the Islamic Revolution in Iran were in the urban middle class 
that sought the removal of the despotic Shah. Instead of leading the revolution, the urban 
middle class was quickly pushed aside by the power of the Shia clerics and their ability to 
mobilize masses of poor and rural Iranians.52  The far more political middle class was 
unable to assume the lead in the face of the power of the Shia religious establishment, 
which consisted of thousands of devoted followers, willing to follow the dictates of their 
clerics, an established organizational structure, a presence in every corner of society, and 
had experience mobilizing masses of people.  This mobilizing ability and power allowed 
the Shia religious establishment to take over the revolution and imbibe it with the 
religious fervor that was to create the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. 
Another example is that of the parallel Islamic sector in Egypt.  When the formal 
political system remained closed to parties and Islamic groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s, an informal network of social service, athletic, and 
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educational organizations developed.53  This informal network allowed Islamists to 
organize and recruit outside of the view of Egyptian authorities. 
Mobilizing structures can be things such as political parties or religious groups. 
The key is that these structures seek to translate individual concerns into collective action 
according to their viewpoint.  For example, Islamic radical groups often use mosques, 
community organizations, and cultural societies, to recruit young Muslims that are 
religiously minded to follow their particular radical ideology.54 
Mobilizing organizations tend to use one of three basic types of collective action: 
violence, disruption and convention.55  Violence is the most likely to encourage 
repression and reaction from the state, but it requires fewer resources.  Convention is 
usually based upon the modes of contention expected in a given society.  Thus, national, 
or state specific modes of mobilization and contention are extremely important.  In other 
words, if most collective action takes the form of demonstration or strikes in a particular 
state, then a social movement in that state will likely use those modes as a way of 
mobilizing and engaging support.  Disruption is when movements seek to keep 
authorities off balance.  The sit in and demonstration were originally disruptive tactics 
used by protest movements such as the American civil rights groups and Ghandi against 
British discrimination in South Africa.56  Over time, these tactics became 
institutionalized and expected.  Disruption therefore is where innovation in the symbolic 
protest of social movements takes place. 
Finally, framing processes are those collective processes of interpretation, 
attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action.57  They 
give people a reason to mobilize for action. Framing processes point out a grievance that 
can be alleviated by joining an organization and forcing change.  The key to the framing 
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process is frame alignment. Frame alignment is when social movement leaders seek to 
use frames that identify an injustice, attribute that injustice to outside forces and propose 
solutions to the injustice that resonate with a target population.58  The framing process 
must resonate though in order for action to occur. 
A good example of this phenomenon is that of the civil rights movement in the 
United States.  The civil rights movement borrowed heavily from the already established 
American discourse on “rights” as a mode of discourse.59  The framing of the struggle for 
civil rights was a bridging device that used the traditional American discourse around 
rights to mobilize already aggrieved blacks as well as whites who were sympathetic to the 
denial of equal rights to blacks.60  It was also the use of non-violent struggle the helped 
frame the struggle as a peaceful, righteous demand for equal treatment under the law. The 
more violent the reaction by white southerners, the more righteous the struggle appeared. 
Thus, framing is a dynamic process with the social movement reacting to and fostering 
reaction from the larger culture.  In the case of the civil rights movement, it was the use 
of the language of rights and non-violence that made its theme resonate with a large 
portion of the American population.  If the civil rights movement had resorted to 
violence, all its talk about civil rights would have been seen as unreasonable.  Similarly, 
the civil rights movement was able to compound the effect of its rights framing the more 
violent the reaction by some white southerners. 
B. RADICALIZATION PROCESS 
Terrorist experts point out that terrorism is often preceded and motivated by a set 
of grievances, but that these grievances are not sufficient by themselves.  People must be 
motivated to act in a violent manner.  Moghaddam points out several factors can foster 
the development of terrorism: group isolation, perceived need for radical change, 
perceived lack of means to affect change, perception of societal or political illegitimacy, 
                                                 
58 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 123. 
59 Ibid., 129. 
60 Ibid., 130. 
 22
among others.61  Ross holds that terrorism develops in conditions of unrest, high levels of 
grievances, counter-terrorism failure, and support among the population.62  These 
grievances can be poverty, lack of political opportunity, discrimination, or anything that 
will motivate people to take violent action.  People often do not have to act upon 
grievances they personally experience.  As Gurr points out “Poverty is seldom invoked 
by militants to justify their actions. Rather they claim to act on behalf of groups that are 
repressed or marginalized by dominant groups.”63  If poverty and political grievances 
were sufficient to motivate radical action, it is likely that the world would be plagued by 
constant conflict. Instead, what is seen is that the incidences of terrorism are rare.   
Richardson puts the issue of grievances and framing even more starkly when she 
states, “For someone who rankles at injustice, identifies with the disadvantaged, and 
wants to help them, becoming a social worker is a more typical career path.”64  It takes 
something more to become a terrorist than simple grievances.  Grievances are ubiquitous 
and terrorists are not.   Instead, grievances for the terrorist become a political and framing 
opportunity to be exploited in recruiting new members to the cause.  Thus the grievance, 
whether it is poverty or repression, is incidental.  
  It is, as Post points out, incumbent upon the group leader to frame a grievance in 
such a way that terrorism is the answer.65  This is where the dynamics between the group 
and the individual meet.  The process of radicalization or turning individuals into 
terrorists involves pushing an individual towards identifying with the group and melding 
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his personality with that of the group.66  As the personal identity fuses with the group the 
struggle becomes more personal. This is especially intensified in religious groups as they 
believe they have a moral obligation and a religiously sanctioned justification for their 
actions.  While some argue that the use of religion as a motivator for terrorist violence 
represents a new form of terrorism, religion remains simply one motivation among many 
possible motivators.67 
With respect to radical Islamists in the West, the radicalization process can take 
many forms.   Jenkins theorizes that jihadist recruits in Western countries are part of a 
marginalized immigrant subculture or are personally cut off from family or friends.68  
The radicalization process can begin at a mosque led by a radical Imam, an informal 
Islamic association, in college, in prisons and on the internet.69  One way that the process 
of becoming a radical Islamist could be through a series of steps: 
The process starts with incitement—a message that commands and 
legitimizes violent jihad—and it combines self selection and persuasion by 
jihadist recruiters.  Volunteers are recruited into a universe of belief, not a 
single destination.  Eager acolytes may coalesce into an autonomous cell, 
as did the original Hamburg group that later carried out the 9/11 attack, or 
they may join and existing local group.  Individuals may be moved along 
to training camps or be persuaded by jihadist exhortation to act on their 
own.70 
What is important to remember is that since the radical Islamist message is widely 
and increasingly distributed, and connections between groups like Al Qaeda and local 
                                                 
66 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Understanding 
Terrorism” In Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, edited by Lawrence Howard, 71–80 (New York: 
Praeger, 1992), 74–75. 
67 Walter Lacquer has argued that in recent years religiously motivated terrorism has formed a “new” 
form of terrorism. He has claimed that terrorism has reached a new stage of destructiveness due to the 
availability of weapons of mass destruction, combined with the apocalyptic views of many religiously 
motivated terrorists. Histrionics aside there is nothing new about terrorism in this age or any other. He is 
right to point out the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, however. See Walter Lacquer, The New 
Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
68 Brian Michael Jenkins, Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment. 
testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment (Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 2007), 3. 
69 Ibid., 4. 
70 Ibid. 
 24
radicals appears random, the level of radicalization in a given society would depend upon 
the number of access points where recruiters can meet potential radicals.71  It is also 
important to remember that while there is no single path toward radicalization, the broad 
patterns of radicalization can be discerned. 
Terrorism therefore can be seen as the result of the processes and dynamics 
highlighted by social movement theories.  Analysts often focus on the grievances of the 
radicalized Muslims, but little attention is given to the underlying structures that enable 
these individuals to act.  Individuals can and do self-radicalize, but more often than not it 
is the presence of an organization that truly fosters the radicalization process.  Social 
movement theory provides a way to conceptualize how radicalization occurs in a given 
society. 
For example, political opportunities can explain how radical groups are able to 
operate within a state.  These groups are able to organize and facilitate the radicalization 
of willing recruits.  When elites are divided as to how to respond or repress such radical 
activity the political opportunity for terrorism exists.   
Organizations capable of taking advantage of such opportunities must be present 
and allowed to operate in order for radicalization to take place.  These organizations can 
utilize the widespread grievances of a population by tailoring their frame in such a way 
that action, in this case violent action, is the method of choice.  Thus, if a large segment 
of the population feels alienated, disadvantaged or repressed, the appeal of a radical 
message is that much greater. 
Thus social movement theory provides the best overall theoretical structure for 
viewing the radicalization process.  In order for the radicalization process to occur it is 
necessary for there to be political opportunities present for radical groups to exist and to 
promulgate their message.  Radical groups that can reach out and mobilize a population 
that is susceptible to their message must be present.  Grievances must be shaped by these 
groups utilizing frames that resonate within the target population.  Individuals within the  
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target population for whom the radical message resonates, must increasingly identify and 
find solidarity within the radicalized group.  Without these elements, it is unlikely that 
radicalization will occur on a regular basis.  
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A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will discuss British Muslims and how a small minority of them 
turned to terrorism.  This chapter will show that the dynamic relationship between the 
British state with respect to its Muslim population provided political opportunities for 
radical Muslim groups.  As per social movement theory, the elites in Britain were divided 
as to what to do with respect to the British Muslim population. They were also unable 
and unwilling, in some cases, to go after radical Muslim groups because they did not see 
them as threats. These radical groups, in turn, capitalized on these political opportunities 
as well as the relatively poor economic situation and alienation of British Muslims to 
recruit members.  This recruitment led to the mobilization of a portion of the British 
Muslim population based on a radical Islamic frame.  Eventually, some members became 
radical enough to support and participate in terrorist activities. 
It is the argument of this chapter that were it not for the broad presence of radical 
groups like the Al Muhajiroun movement, and the inability of the British government to 
suppress radical groups, due to internal divisions and lack of capacity, British Muslims 
would be less likely to turn to terrorism.  The presence of radical Muslim groups and 
charities provides the mobilization gateway terrorist groups need to find and socialize 
their recruits.  In fact, the Al Muhajiroun movement is linked to the fertilizer bomb plot 
in which five British men received life sentences.72  It was officially disbanded in 2004 
but reconstituted itself as different groups that continue to operate in Britain.73  At the 
very least its support for, and avocation of, violence certainly creates an environment 
where violence is tolerated by a portion of the population. It is held up as an example of 
how a radical groups in Britain socialize young Muslims into the world of radical Islam. 
The terrorists involved in the 7/7 bombing, the 7/21 attempted bombing, and the 
transatlantic airline plot, all followed a roughly similar radicalization path.  This 
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radicalization path is similar to that followed by other radical Muslims in Britain in that a 
radicalized conduit, whether it was a political movement or a charity, was present to help 
channel them toward radicalization and ultimately terrorism.  It should be noted though 
that the path to radicalization varies greatly. The claim of this paper is that, if it were not 
for the political opportunities present in Britain, the radicalization process would not be 
facilitated and accelerated by groups and networks.  Indeed, the 7/7 bombers were linked 
to several individuals in the wide-ranging CREVICE investigation who were, in turn, 
linked to Al Muhajiroun.74  
In the end, it will be shown that were it not for the presence and active 
mobilization of British Muslims by radical groups, the terrorism problem within Britain 
would be significantly different.  For example, the French government cracked down on 
Muslim extremists after multiple bombings in the mid-1990s.  Since then its problems 
with radical Islamic groups have been limited.  The British Government has been slow to 
awaken to the troubles within its Muslim community.  It is likely that the same levels of 
discontent would exist, even without the presence of radical Islamic groups, but the 
likelihood of terrorism would be less due to the lack of organizations able to facilitate the 
radicalization process.  
B. BRITISH MUSLIM CONDITIONS 
Compared with the majority population of Britain, British Muslims are socially 
and economically much worse off.   According to a 2003 report by the European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia on employment, British Muslims had 
unemployment rates higher than twenty percent, compared with six percent in the broader 
population of Britain.75  Two-thirds of British Muslims live in low-income housing.  A 
quarter of British Muslims live in overcrowded housing, compared with two percent of 
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white British citizens.76  British Muslims who are in the labor force also tend to earn less 
than their white counterparts in Britain with over 50 percent of Muslims earning less than 
$1,200 a week.77  British Muslims, which account for about three percent (2 million) of 
the British population, are also disproportionately represented in British prisons as they 
represent eight percent of the prison population.78  All these factors paint a picture of a 
Muslim population that has, at the very least, an economic and social life that is 
significantly different than that experienced by mainstream British society. 
British Muslims’ attitudes, according to polling data and interviews, largely 
comports with the above data.  British Muslims experience is one of “hopelessness,” as 
one London Imam described it.79  Young British Muslims have identified more readily 
with their religion than with their particular ethnic group or even with the British state.80  
When asked if they felt they were doing well or saw that their conditions would be 
improving, only seven percent felt that their place in British society would be 
improving.81  Furthermore, according to Sophie Gilliat-Ray, due to the level of racism in 
parts of British Society, young Muslims’ feelings of belonging to British society are 
weak.82   
Additionally, it is not just the views of Muslims that is a factor in this discussion; 
it is the views of both British Muslims and their non-Muslim fellow citizens.  How each 
sees the other is vitally important as it helps flesh out the level of perceived 
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discrimination.  According to the Gallup Coexist Index, 26 percent of the British public 
as a whole views people of other faiths (non-Christian) as a threat, while only three 
percent of British Muslims feel the same way.83  When asked various questions about 
what their views of Muslim women wearing the headscarf were, the British public, as 
opposed to their Muslim fellow citizens, was twice as likely to negatively associate the 
headscarf with fanaticism, oppression, and discrimination against women.84  
Interestingly, 45 percent of the British public as a whole believes that, in order for British 
Muslims to be fully integrated, they must learn to accept public comments that they 
perceive as offensive.  Only 9 percent of British Muslims agree.85  This reveals yet 
another gap in how the British view each other. It would seem that the British public 
attitude is that minorities are being overly sensitive to public slights.  This could translate 
into a broad lack of sensitivity toward legitimate Muslim concerns regarding propriety 
and respect for religious symbols.  
British Muslims have more negative views of Westerners than even some 
countries in the Middle East.  According to one poll, British Muslims were more likely 
than Egyptian Muslims to view Westerners as selfish, arrogant, and violent.86  In fact, 
British Muslims ascribe a much greater percentage of negative traits upon Westerners 
versus what Westerners bestow upon Muslims.87  British Muslims and the British public 
as a whole agree that relations between the West and the Muslim world are bad.  A 
quarter of the British public views Muslims as the cause of troubled relationship, while 
nearly half of British Muslims believe Westerners are to blame.88 
The British public appears to be wary of its Muslim fellow citizens.  British 
Muslims readily identify with their faith at least as much as with their country.89  This 
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seems to have translated into a perceived loyalty gap, with 49  percent of the British 
public questioning the loyalty of their Muslim fellow citizens.90  According to a Pew 
Global Attitudes study, a majority of the British public views being a devout Muslim as 
potentially conflicting with living in a modern society, while British Muslims appear 
evenly split on the issue.91  This suggests that British Muslims are unsure of how being a 
Muslim can be accommodated with participating in modern British society.  
It is also suggestive of the identity politics involved in being a Muslim in British 
society.  As is true for most people, religion is only one aspect of their lives.  Half of 
mainstream British society perceives British Muslims as potentially disloyal.  Thus, a 
British Muslim may feel that they have to defend or justify their faith unnecessarily.  This 
also can lead some Muslims to identify even more with their faith, as they are already 
being judged and classified solely on that basis.  Given the other data cited above 
regarding British Muslims, high identification with their religion, and the conflict 
between faith and integration, becomes all the more stark. 
Additionally, British Muslims interact within a society that has conflicting views 
with respect to religion. Britain does have a national church in the form of the Anglican 
Church.  This informs much of the debate regarding the role and place of Islam within 
British society.92  On the one hand, there is a hostile attitude toward Islam, as it 
represents a foreign religion. On the other hand, accommodation for Muslims receives the 
support of religious leaders within the Anglican Church because they both find common 
cause on several values issues.  This in turn fosters a level of division in elite attitudes as 
they see some aspects of even radical Muslim groups’ efforts in British society as 
legitimate, especially with respect to education.93 
Based on the data above, it is clear that relations between British Muslims and the 
British public as a whole are, at best, strained.  British Muslims appear alienated from the 
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mainstream of British society.  They feel that their prospects for improvement are low 
and that British society just does not understand their issues.  Social movement theory 
would see these strained relations as a motivational potentiality that would need political 
opportunities in order to mobilize support.94  In this environment, radical groups, such as 
the Al Muhajiroun movement can, and do, find significant political opportunities as their 
very existence can attest.  They capitalize on the latent discontent within the British 
Muslim community by treating the discontent as a recruitment opportunity. 
C. MUHAJIROUN MOVEMENT 
The Al Muhajiroun movement in Britain provides an interesting case study of 
how a militant, radical Islamist groups operates in a western society.  By reviewing the 
case of the Al Muhajiroun movement one of the processes by which British born 
Muslims become radicalized will be clearer.  This paper will then compare the 
radicalization of the 7/7 terrorists and others who were foiled to show that a similar path 
to radicalization was followed.   
The Al Muhajiroun movement, which is an offshoot of the Hizb ut-Tahrir 
movement, is a transnational, militant Islamic group based in Britain.  When Al 
Muhajiroun split off from Hizb ut-Tahrir, it took many disaffected Hizb ut-Tahrir 
members and soon became the most visible Islamic movement in Britain.95  It was 
assessed, prior to its disbandment in 2004, to have about 160 formal members, with over 
700 followers who take religious lessons from the group and occasionally participate in 
activist activities, and nearly 7000 contacts in the Muslim community who occasionally 
attend lessons.96  Al Muhajiroun is not as extreme as Al Qaeda, but it does support 
violent causes and can be considered a part of the radical fringe of the British Muslim  
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community.97  The majority of Al Muhajiroun activists are Britain-born Muslims; 
therefore studying its recruiting process should provide insight into how British Muslims 
become radicalized.98 
Wiktorowicz argues that the radicalization process involved with the Al 
Muhajiroun and other radical movements involves three key steps: a cognitive opening, 
recognition of group as a credible source of Islamic interpretation, and socialization into 
the group.  Once these three steps are complete individuals become ready to engage in 
high-risk activism.  
A cognitive opening is when an individual becomes more open to new ideas and 
old beliefs and modes of thought are questioned.  Activists attempt to foster this opening 
through community outreach.  As Wiktorowicz argues, individuals rarely awake with a 
sudden desire for radical ideas.  Instead, the process of radicalization involves being open 
to radical ideas in the first place.  When radical Muslims begin talking about Zionists, 
Crusaders and the need for violence to oppose them, most Muslims tune them out.99 
Therefore, activists seek to create an opening through social networks and outreach 
efforts.  They seek to create a sense of crisis that can be alleviated through the platform of 
the group.  As Wiktorowicz states “In the West, many Muslims have experienced an 
identity crisis that makes them question what it means to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim 
country.”100  This identity crisis for a large segment of British Muslims, created by poor 
socio-economic conditions, alienation, and in some cases outright racism, provides a 
broad recruiting pool from which  radical groups seek to draw support.  Activists utilize 
this discontent to steer would-be recruits toward Al Muhajiroun’s way of thinking.  
A Muhajiroun activist illustrates how this process of socialization and the 
exploitation of cognitive openings works in the British Muslim community.  
An older member of al-Muhajiroun, for example, recalled his earlier life in 
a rough section of London.  He was involved in crime at the time, and 
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some friends of his family, who belonged to al-Muhajiroun, worked to 
bring him “back to Islam.”  They focused on addressing his criminal 
activities and getting him to reexamine his life.  Eventually they convinced 
him to “shape up,” and he started attending movement lessons. Today as 
an activist in al-Muhajiroun, he repeats the  same process for others in his 
community.  He works in his old neighborhood with disadvantaged youth 
who knew him before he joined the movement and he uses his 
transformation as a role model.  He argues that the purpose of his 
interactions is not recruitment per se but to bring them to Islam. Several of 
these youth have since joined the movement.101 
It was involvement in drugs and the desire to have him “shape up” that created a 
cognitive opening for the activist.  It could just as well been estrangement from family or 
an experience of outright racism that creates a cognitive opening exploitable by radicals.   
A cognitive opening facilitates the movement of a would-be radical, but it alone is 
not sufficient.  An organization must be there to take advantage of that opening. It is 
argued that in open political systems, such as that found in Britain, a formal organization 
is the best way to facilitate recruitment.102  Al Muhajiroun has multiple regional groups 
that coordinate the activities of local groups.  Each local group, in turn, makes its own 
decisions as to how best to implement the overall strategy of the group.  A good example 
of this is Al Muhajiroun’s seeking to tap into the British Muslim concern over Islamic 
education.  At the local level, they seek to provide this service through an offering of 
lessons in the Quran and Islamic teachings.103  Clearly, this education will be provided 
according to the ideology of Al Muhajiroun.  Yet it is the ability of this group to tap into 
local concerns over Islamic education that provides it with its recruitment opportunity. 
Moreover, it is these legitimate efforts in education, that help divide British opinion 
regarding the nature of groups like Al Muhajiroun, as stated above.104 
As for Al Muhajiroun’s claim to a more authoritative and credible source of 
Islamic authority, much of it rests on the charismatic leadership of Omar Bakri 
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Muhammed.  He is seen as more credible than other sources available to British Muslims 
because of his knowledge and encouragement of questions.105   Many British Muslims, 
especially the young, seek a more politically oriented Islam than that of their parents.106 
Al-Muhajiroun, and groups like it, provides this political Islam. 
The third factor that Wiktorowicz highlights in his study of al-Muhajiroun is the 
socialization process.  Al Muhajiroun demands intense involvement of its activists. Much 
of Al Muhajiroun’s ideological platform is the same as other fundamentalist Islamic 
groups.  It demands propagation of the faith, enjoining the good and forbidding evil and 
work to reestablish the caliphate.107  Merely joining the organization is not enough; 
activists must act on their beliefs.108  The socialization process outlined by Wiktorowicz 
can be equated to the radicalization process outlined in Chapter II. Group members are 
drawn in and through intense involvement in Al Muhajiroun activities, come to identify 
more with the group than themselves. 
The British government gives radical groups an opportunity by not cracking down 
on their radical message and support for violent Islamic activism. This allows Al 
Muhajiroun, and other radical groups, to take advantage of the grievances and alienation 
felt by the British Muslim community in order to expand their influence.  They are able 
to then capitalize on cognitive openings that allow their radical ideology to provide an 
answer for the ills of British Muslims.  Through socialization, they encourage activism on 
the part of members. While there is no single path for any radicalization, the case of Al 
Muhajiroun provides insight into how a radical group can facilitate the process.  As was 
pointed out in Chapter II, radical groups can intensify and shape local discontent, 
sometimes toward terrorism.109  
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D. 7/7 BOMBERS 
At 0850 London time on July 7, 2005, three nearly simultaneous explosions 
occurred: two on the Circle Line and one on the Piccadilly Line.  Almost an hour later, at 
0947 London time, a fourth and final bomb went off on the upper deck of a number 30 
bus in Tavistock Square.  The death total would be 56 people, including the four 
bombers, and 700 wounded, some severely. 
According to the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 
July 2005, “The backgrounds of the 4 men appear largely unexceptional.”110 Mohammad 
Sidique Khan, at age 30, was the oldest of the group and appears to be the ringleader. 
Shezhad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain, 22 and 18 respectively, hailed from Leeds, just like 
Khan.  Jermaine Lindsay, 19, was the outsider of the group, born in Jamaica and raised in 
Britain.  All were Muslim, with Lindsay converting in 2000.   The three Leeds bombers, 
Khan, Hussain, and Tanweer, grew up in a part of town that was densely populated and 
deprived, with 10,000 of the 16,300 residents in the worst 3 percent of households 
nationally.111  But the three were actually above average in income for the area.112  Khan 
joined the staff of a local school to help special and disadvantaged youth in 2001.  
Tanweer went to school until 2002 and worked at his father’s fish and chip shop until late 
2004.  Hussain attended school off and on until June 2005.  Lindsay, after his conversion 
in 2000 to Islam, began associating with troublemakers at school, but was praised for his 
quick study of Arabic and the Quran.  In 2002, his mother left Britain for the United 
States and he was left behind.  That same year he left school and lived on the dole while 
doing odd jobs selling phones and Islamic books. 
Even given the relatively normal background of the four bombers, there were 
subtle signs that they had began to move towards extremist views around 2001.  Khan, 
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the leader of the group, was highly regarded by the parents of the students he taught at in 
Leeds.113  He was described as quiet and extremely good with the young children in the 
area.114  Khan also worked to rid the streets of drugs, which were a particular plague 
during the time he was working at the primary school.  Unemployment was at 40 percent 
for Muslims in the area, and drug use had increased.  He was able to make some progress, 
enough at least to be noticed by the husband of a local teacher, who was a member of 
parliament.115  
According to an interview with one of Khan’s friends, Khan appears to have 
become sympathetic to radical Islamic preaching due to the visit of a radical preacher in 
1999, which was the same preacher that appeared to convert Lindsay to Islam, Abdallah 
al Faisal.116  His move to radicalization likely began shortly after the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq when he suddenly became much more observant, and distanced himself from old 
friends.  He began spending more time with Hussain and Tanweer, who he mentored at a 
local gym.117  
Tanweer appears to have become more extreme around mid-2002.  Islam became 
a major focus of his life during this time and he lost interest in school.118  It seems that for 
Tanweer, the factor that led to his conversion to radical Islam took place shortly after 
9/11.  After 9/11, many Muslims felt even more discrimination and questioning of their 
loyalty by other British.  This led many to assert their identity even more and “go back to 
Islam.”119 
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Hussain undertook a Hajj visit to Saudi Arabia with his family in 2002.  After this 
trip, he started wearing traditional Muslim clothing and became openly supportive of Al 
Qaeda, calling them “martyrs”.120 
Lindsay was also influenced by the extremist preacher, Abdallah al Faisal.  He 
attended at least one lecture and listened to tapes from other lectures by Faisal.  He was 
active in Muslim circles in the Drewsbury area and likely met Khan sometime around 
2003–2004.121 
The three men from Leeds, Khan, Hussain, and Tanweer, also frequented the local 
gym together, described as the “Al Qaida gym,” as well as a local bookstore, in which 
they watched extremist videos.122  The gyms and the local bookstore were considered 
centers of extremist activity by other locals.  None of the mosques of the area were 
assessed by the Official Report of the London Bombings to have harbored extremist 
views.  But, many of the local mosques were started by first generation immigrants and 
were viewed by the local youth as old men clubs.123  Thus, it is entirely likely that as a 
sign of protest, and as a matter of necessity, the radical elements in Leeds focused on 
congregating in gyms and bookstores. 
It is through his local interaction with the youth of Leeds that Khan was able to 
form what some considered a gang in the local area called the Mullah Crew.  This gang 
was admired and feared in the local area, with one of Khan’s neighbors fearing 
retribution for talking about him after the London bombings.124  Khan worked with 
Tanweer to perform “strong arm” social work through the Mullah Crew, which had a 
measure of community support.125  The community support was likely due to the fact that 
the strong-arm social work was aimed at keeping the local youth from turning to crime 
and drug use, which was, as stated earlier, plagued by unemployment and a significant 
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drug problem.  This gang met underneath one of the local mosques and organized 
outdoor activities, which kept Khan, Tanweer and Hussain away from the Leeds area for 
days at a time, which served to further isolate them from their community. 
Other factors played a role in the radicalization of the core group of Khan, 
Tanweer, and Hussain.  In 2001, riots broke out in northern England between young 
Muslim men and whites in the area.  The riots were triggered by rumors that white racist 
groups, such as the National Front, were organizing against the Asian youth of the area.  
Many Asian youths in northern England began forming groups to protect their 
communities.126  Thus, given the economic and social problems of the communities of 
Muslims in northern England during this time, it is likely that the riots led to feelings of 
further alienation from the rest of British society.  The 9/11 attacks and subsequent 
invasion of Afghanistan and the highly unpopular invasion of Iraq likely contributed to a 
sense of being under siege. 
There was no single factor at work, or one single source of grievance for any of 
the 7/7 bombers. There were multiple grievances at work in their lives, from the situation 
in their local community to their association with radical groups in the Leeds area. 
Nevertheless, their sense of sense of alienation and the radicalization that developed in 
response likely led Khan and Tanweer to seek to do something about their situation.  It is 
also possible that they sought outside support.  In 2003, Khan was assessed by British 
Security services to have received some training in Pakistan during a two-week visit.127  
It is unknown precisely who he met or what training he received; at the very least it is 
likely he was likely encouraged to act on his increasingly radical beliefs.  Later, in late 
2004 and early 2005, both Khan and Tanweer visited Pakistan, where, according to 
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security services were aware of the possibility that Khan and Tanweer had contact with 
Al Qaeda, but were unable to act further on this information due to the sheer volume of 
suspected terrorists.128  
Based on the evidence it is likely that the core group of Khan, Tanweer, and 
Hussain were radicalized prior to any contact with Al Qaeda members.  They all 
appeared to be influenced greatly by local conditions, which were exasperated by outside 
events such as 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq.  Thus the idea that European Muslims are 
radicalized due to outside conflicts related to Muslims only partially explains the 7/7 
bombings.  
The invasion of Iraq was likely seen as the final straw and indication that the 
West was at war with Islam.  Indeed, there was significant opposition to the Iraq war and 
many in Britain felt that the Iraq war was partially the cause of the London bombings.129  
As Pargeter argues, the 7/7 bombers had been active in radical circles well before the Iraq 
invasion and as in the case of Khan, even before 9/11.130  After all, Khan’s statement, 
released after the attacks, claims, “your democratically elected governments continuously 
perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world.”131  It is unlikely, given such a 
statement, that a change in British foreign policy would have assuaged Khans anger at the 
British state.  Therefore, one of the causes of the London bombings appears to be the 
internal politics between British Muslim citizens and their government as well as the 
availability of access to radical networks within Britain and abroad.  Without local 
contacts, it is unlikely that British born Muslims would have been able to walk into an al 
Qaeda training camp in Pakistan and ask for assistance. 
In this light, the video statement by Khan, released after the London bombings, 
which is accompanied by Al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Al Zawahiri, is put in better 
perspective.  Al Qaeda was likely aware of the attacks and decided to claim some of the 
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credit, even though it was largely the product of local radicalization.  Al Zawahiri’s 
comments were likely designed to give the impression that the bombings were a wholly 
Al Qaeda driven operation, when in fact it was the product of local radicalization.  
E. 7/21 BOMBERS 
 While the 7/21 would-be bombers, Ibrahim, Omar, Mohamed, and Osman, were 
not native born British, they had all been in Britain for over a decade.  Indeed, they were 
radicalized while in Britain.  They tried to repeat the attack of the 7/7 bombers by 
attacking the same targets: the underground and a red bus.  This attack received less press 
attention because the attackers were not native born and they had different backgrounds 
than the 7/7 bombers.132  Yet their radicalization while in Britain is strikingly similar. 
 The leader of the 7/21 bombers, Ibrahim, was born in Eritrea and came to Britain 
in 1990. He was known to be involved in gang culture and petty crimes.  In 1998, he 
became increasingly involved in radical Islam in London through the Finesbury park 
mosque, a notoriously radical mosque, led by radical preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri.133 
Sometime in 2003, he is alleged to have traveled to Sudan to undertake militant 
training.134  In 2004, he was arrested after an altercation as he was trying to distribute 
Islamic literature.  In early 2005, he travelled to Pakistan and, upon his return, it is 
speculated that he hatched the plan to attack the underground. 
 Omar and Mohamed were both born in Somali and came to Britain in the 1990s. 
Omar drifted into militant Islam in the late 1990s.  Mohamed drifted toward militant 
Islam around 2003, and his views became increasingly radical.  Both men became friends 
with Ibrahim, while attending the Finesbury Park mosque.135  Both cut themselves off 
from friends and family as they became more devout, often quitting jobs that interfered 
with their religious duties.  It has been assessed that one of the reasons they were 
attracted to radical Islam was that they were “vulnerable” personalities, as in the case of 
                                                 
132 Pageter, The New Frontiers of Jihad, 159. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Ibid., 160. 
 42
Omar, and disadvantaged, as both were in the care of social services at one point or 
another.136  It is likely that the Finesbury Park Mosque and its social network gave them 
the sense of belonging and purpose that their lives were lacking.  It is also likely that 
radicals associated with the Finesbury Park Mosque also took advantage of the cognitive 
openings created by their search for religious meaning in their lives. 
 Osman came to Britain in the late 1990s and claimed asylum from Somalia, even 
though he was born in Ethiopia.  Upon moving to London, he became more devout and 
withdrawn.  He too was an attendee of the Finesbury Park mosque and follower of Abu 
Hamza Al-Masri.137  There were two other alleged conspirators in the 7/21 bombing; one 
claiming to be forced to be involved and another acquitted of conspiracy to murder 
charges.138 
 The 7/21 bombers were all radicalized in a manner similar to how al-Muhajiroun 
recruits its own members.  The 7/21 bombers were recruited by Mohammed Hamid, who 
styled himself as “Osama Bin London.”139  Hamid ran a stall on London’s Oxford Street 
where he handed out radical Muslim literature and issued invitations to prayer group 
meetings at his house.  The prayer meetings often revolved around discussing British and 
American foreign policy as well as watching extremist videos.  He also took young men 
on paint ball and outdoor trips, which echoes the activities of the 7/7 bombers.  In fact, 
Hamid and Ibrahim were both arrested outside of the Oxford Street stall in 2004 for 
acting aggressively towards the public and verbally abusing a police officer.140 
 The 7/21 case provides an interesting view of the radicalization process in Britain. 
While none of the 7/21 bombers were native born, they were radicalized while in Britain. 
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They were not agents sent by Al Qaeda.  If anything, they were normal immigrants who, 
through alienation and lack of opportunities drifted into radical Muslim circles. 
Eventually they became radical enough to attempt the 7/21 bombing.  In their case, the 
radicalization element is obvious in the Finesbury Park mosque and Hamid.  The timing 
of the trips to Pakistan and the similarities of the attacks also suggest broad network 
connection between the 7/7 and 7/21 bombers.  This in turn suggests the presence of a 
broad mobilization network within Britain. 
 While the source of grievances and specific mode of radicalization differ between 
Al Muhajiroun recruits, the 7/7 bombers and the 7/21 bombers, the similarities are 
striking.  In each case, it was the open and freely operating presence of radicals that were 
able to shape a message that resonated with the would-be radicals. These radicals were 
able to capitalize on informal social networks surrounding mosques. Due to the 
conflicting and ambivalent views of the British toward Muslim religious organizations, as 
well as lax counterterrorism enforcement, these networks and organizations were allowed 
to operate and recruit openly in Britain.  This is also true for the in the transatlantic 
bombing plot. 
F. TRANSATLANTIC BOMBING PLOT 
 In August of 2006, British authorities arrested 24 men, who they accused of being 
involved in a massive and complicated plot to blow up flights between Britain and the 
United States using liquid explosives.  The plot, had it been successful, would have been 
the largest act of terrorism since 9/11, according to some security officials.141  Later in 
2008 three of the accused men, Abdulla Ahmed Ali, Assad Sarwar, and Tanvir Hussain, 
were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder.  A second trial that ended in September 
2009 found the three men guilty of a conspiracy to bomb airliners.  They each received 
the maximum sentence in Britain, which is life imprisonment.  
 The background of the three accused men, as well as that of alleged Al Qaeda 
connections with which they were accused of having contact with follows the pattern 
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shown above.  In each man’s case, he was radicalized while in Britain through local 
organizations and charities.  Although in this instance there were more outside 
connections, the local element was paramount for the development of the plot.   
 Rashid Rauf was assessed as one of the masterminds of the plot and the key 
connection between the British-born Muslims and Al Qaeda in Pakistan.142  Press reports 
claimed that Rauf had regular contacts with senior Al Qaeda leaders, such as Amjad 
Hussain Farooqi, Abu Faraj al Libi, and Abu Ubayda al Masri.143  Additionally, Rashid 
Rauf’s father founded the Crescent Relief organization in Britain in 2000.  This 
organization had its assets frozen in August 2006 upon suspicion of misuse of funds in 
support of terrorism operations.144  The Crescent Relief organization was previously 
under suspicion due to irregularities and possible connections with other charities linked 
to terrorism by United States authorities.145 
 Rauf’s background is strikingly similar to the other cases reviewed.  His father 
immigrated to England in the 1960s and opened a bakery.146  He was not very religious 
or political. He was more likely to go to the gym or play soccer than go to the mosque.147  
In 2002, Rauf’s uncle was stabbed to death in what appeared to be an honor killing for 
“sexual misconduct” and Rauf fled to Pakistan.148  He was arrested in August 2006 by 
Pakistani officials in connection and interrogated regarding training camps along the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border.  British authorities requested his extradition in August 2006 
because of his suspected involvement in his uncle’s murder.149  Eventually Pakistani 
charges were withdrawn and in late 2007, he escaped police custody.150 
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 Abdulla Ahmed Ali’s, also known as Ahmed Ali Khan, was born in London.  He 
was considered the local leader of the airline plot by British officials, while Rauf was the 
point of contact for the group with Al Qaeda.151   Ali’s parents moved to Britain from 
Pakistan in the 1960s.  In the 1980s, the family went to Pakistan for six years before 
returning to east London in 1987.  According to court records, Ali became radicalized as 
early as 15.  It was only later, however, while at college, that he became politically 
active. He handed out leaflets and attended demonstrations.  After graduating college, he 
began volunteering with the Islamic charity Crescent Relief in east London.   In January 
2003, he travelled to a refugee camp for Afghans in Pakistan. British authorities claimed 
that the instructions for the plot were obtained during Ali’s time in Pakistan.152  Ali 
claimed that the 7/7 bombing and Al Qaeda’s message in general were his inspirations.153 
 Assad Sarwar was 28 years old and married.  He arranged the logistics of the plot.  
After dropping out of Brunel University, Sarwar met Abdulla Ahmed Ali while doing 
charity work in Pakistan with the Islamic Medical Association in late 2002.  He returned 
to Britain in May 2003 and drifted through two further short-term jobs as a postman with 
Royal Mail and for British Telecom.154  He said he met up with Ali again in 2003 and 
again in 2006 at lectures in east London. Sarwar also attended Islamic study groups run 
by Tablighi Jamaat, a Pakistani missionary group.155  In between, Sarwar returned to 
Pakistan for two months in October 2005 aiding survivors of the earthquake in Kashmir.  
 Tanvir Hussain, 27, from Leyton, east London, was described as a gifted 
sportsman by Abdulla Ahmed Ali, whom he met while studying at Waltham Forest 
College.  Hussain later went to Middlesex University.  He told the court he regularly 
drank and took drugs while a student and he had a reputation as a womanizer.  Later, he 
became a devout Muslim; some friends even said he started showing signs of extremism. 
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 There were five others who were accused of conspiracy to murder. Arafat 
Wahhed Khan and Waheed Zaman were found not guilty of the airliner plot, while Umar 
Islam was convicted of conspiracy to murder.  A British Muslim convert, Donald 
Steward-Whyte was found not guilty of conspiracy to murder in the airline plot, but did 
admit to a conspiracy to commit a public nuisance. 
 It is clear that in the case of this terrorism plot the key factor was the mobilization 
power of the Islamic political and charitable organizations.  As in the other case studies 
above, the individuals appear to have been radicalized by local Islamic groups prior to 
any contact with outside terrorist organizations.  It was through personal networks and 
the networks of the Islamic organizations that these individuals were brought into the 
world of radical Islam.  In some cases, the individual was influenced by a close friend or 
even and influential cleric. 
 The sources of the individuals’ grievances against the British state were also 
varied. There appears no single cause for their turn to terrorism.  Instead, what can be 
said is that these individuals’ contact with radical Islam, both in Britain and in Pakistan, 
caused them to turn to terrorism.  Had they not been exposed to groups with the 
connections and ability to mobilize and shape their grievances, it can be argued that they 
would simply remained aggrieved, alienated British Muslims instead of terrorists.  Ali, as 
the leader and the man with the most ties to radical groups, was able to bring the others 
along toward a single goal, despite their differing grievances and reasons for associating 
with radical Islam.  
 This too highlights how the socialization process works and remained similar 
through all cases; an organization that was allowed to operate and even recruit openly in 
Britain was able to capitalize on that opportunity to mobilize discontented Muslim youth.  
In some cases, the most immediate radicalizing element was the small group or social 
circle. Yet it was the presence of larger groups that was essential to the development of 
the terrorist plots.  It is unlikely, despite the availability of information over the Internet, 
that any of the above plots would have progressed as they had through self-radicalization 
alone.  It was the presence of radical organizations in Britain that was vital.  
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G. BRITISH COUNTERTERRORISM 
 It is very informative to look at how the British counterterrorism system looked 
around the time of the 7/7 bombing. This will illustrate the difficulty the British 
government had in understanding the threat it had within its borders.  It will also show 
that a political opportunity was handed to the Islamic radicals through the weak British 
counterterrorism system.  Radical Islamists were allowed to operate more or less openly, 
which provided cover for the even more radical terrorist groups. 
 The British government was aware of the possibility of domestic Muslim 
terrorists prior to 2005.   In 1998, eight British Muslims, with ties to Abu Hamza, were 
arrested and convicted of being involved in a bomb plot by Yemeni authorities.  In 2000, 
a Mohammaed Bilal, who was born and raised in Britain, conducted a suicide attack at an 
Indian base in Indian Kashmir.  Richard Reid, the “Shoe Bomber,” was arrested in 
December of 2001 after he tried to light explosives hidden in his show in a transatlantic 
flight to the United States. Richard Reid had converted to Islam in prison, but was 
radicalized by extremist elements hanging out near his Brixton mosque.156 
   In 2003, two British born Muslims carried out suicide attacks on behalf of Hamas 
that resulted in the death of three Israelis.  The martyr videos released after the attacks 
claimed the true villains of the world were Tony Blair, George Bush and the Israelis.157  
 The result of all of the attacks by British citizens outside Britain was to increase 
the British governments concern about an attack within its own borders.  By 2003, British 
Muslims had become Britain’s number one terrorist threat and MI5’s investigative targets 
would be increased by 300 percent.158  One of the investigations launched between 2003 
and 2005 would involve Khan and Tanweer at the periphery. 
 Operation CREVICE, as MI5 called it, began in 2003 with intelligence indicating 
the presence of an Al Qaeda facilitation network in Britain.  In early 2004, additional 
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intelligence was obtained which indicated that the persons being investigated were not 
merely facilitators but actively involved in planning a bombing operation.159  These 
suspects also had affiliation with the Al Muhajiroun movement.160  Operation CREVICE 
then became MI5’s top investigative target, warranting additional resources. According 
the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on whether the London bombings could 
have been prevented, this operation “…was the immediate priority and absorbed nearly 
all of MI5’s resources.”161  The investigation obtained information in February 2003 that 
the plot had become more serious, which resulted in the arrest of eight British men in 
April 2004.   Five of the eight men were convicted on terrorism related charges in 2007.  
During Operation CREVICE, Khan and Tanweer were shown to be associates of the 
plotters, but not involved in the actual planning.  Khan and Tanweer were not 
investigated thoroughly due to limited resources. 
 After the arrests in Operation CREVICE, MI5 received information about another 
plot, which ended up consuming considerable MI5 resources.  The plot was to set off a 
possible dirty bomb, as well as coordinated bombs using limousines.  The plotters were 
arrested in August of 2004.  The plotters had ties to the radical Finesbury mosque in 
London and its now jailed cleric Abu Hamza.162  After the disruption of this plot, MI5 
returned to investigating the nearly 4,000 contacts generated during Operation 
CREVICE, in addition to the contacts generated during the dirty bomb plot.163  
There were at least six other plots that MI5 was investigating that were also 
consuming considerable resources.  In each case, MI5 had to prioritize its targets to 
prevent loss of life, while trying also to make sure every lead was followed.164  This was 
a daunting task, but MI5 seemed to indicate that it had the situation under control. 
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The fact that Khan and Tanweer were mentioned as part of Operation 
CREVICE’s investigation during the investigation into the London Bombings caused 
many people to question MI5 and the Metropolitan Police about their cooperation and 
investigative abilities. 165  The Intelligence and Security Report concerning the 
prevention of the London bombings stated that Metropolitan Police did not automatically 
inform MI5 when it received terrorist information, nor did MI5 have the legal power to 
pass the Metropolitan Police all the information it has on terrorist suspects.166  
Furthermore, prior to 2005, it was not possible for MI5 to provide coverage for 52 people 
deemed essential targets; reasonable coverage was provided for only six percent of the 
overall known threat.167   Part of the problem was that early on in the CREVICE 
investigation Khan was dismissed as a peripheral figure and not worth the investigative 
resources.   Had he been followed up on then authorities would likely have him followed 
to Pakistan, where he likely met with Al Qaeda figures.168  The British security services 
were simply overwhelmed by the sheer amount of plots and persons under investigation 
to focus on all the leads they had. 
 The British government was caught largely unaware by the domestic threat 
brewing within its borders.  As the Intelligence and Security Committee report states, 
“…across the whole of the counter-terrorism community the development of the home-
grown  threat  and the radicalization of British citizens were not fully understood or 
applied to strategic thinking.”169  The Committee report also argues that there was not an 
appreciation for the speed with which radicalization occurs.  The Official Report into the  
 
                                                 
165 Britain has a single police force with many local branches. The Metropolitan Police act as this 
local police force. It has numerous special branches that are designed to combat terrorism at the local and 
national level. The relationship between the Metropolitan Police and MI5 can be considered analogous to 
that between state and local police forces and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
166 Intelligence and Security Committee Report, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? 
167 Rachel Williams and Richard Norton-Taylor, “7/7 Bomb Attacks: Police and MI5 Cleared of 
Blame,” guardian.co.uk. May 19, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/may/19/july7-ataks (accessed 
May 28, 2009). 
168 David Brown “UK Source Examines Police, MI5 Officers’ Failure to Stop 7/7 Terrorism 
Suspects.” Times Online. April 29, 2008. http://timesonline.co.uk (accessed May 22, 2009). 
169 Intelligence and Security Committee Report, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? 43. 
 50
London bombings largely echoes this conclusion by arguing that there was little to 
indicate that these individuals were being radicalized.170  These conclusions are 
understandable but flawed.   
 The British government knew it had a potential threat within its borders well 
before 9/11 and certainly before the war in Iraq.171  It knew that the Iraq war would 
heighten the risk for terrorist attacks, yet it did little to address this potentiality.  Instead, 
it focused on placing blame away from foreign policy, which would have shown that its 
policies potentially heightened the terrorist threat.   Part of the problem too was the 
British governments’ general lack of interest in its Muslim population, especially as a 
potential source of violence.  Some within the government and police objected to banning 
radical groups like Hizb ut Tahir, viewing them as distasteful but not potential sources of 
radicalization.172  Therefore, it can be said that the British government, which at the 
political level ignored the repeated warnings, provided a political opportunity for radical 
groups like Hizb Ut Tahir and Al Muhajiroun to operate freely.  Had they recognized the 
radicalizing effect of these organizations, and made an effort to curb their activities, they 
could have reduced the terrorist threat within their borders.  
H. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 This chapter reviewed the conditions of British Muslims and looked at select case 
studies to determine how and why some British Muslims become radicalization.  It is 
clear that the grievances of British Muslims provide an opportunity that is exploited by 
Islamic groups. The radical Islamic groups utilize radical Islamic themes that capitalize 
on the Muslim alienation from British society.  This finding follows the theory outlined 
in Chapter II regarding the similar relationship between how social movements work and 
how terrorists seek to recruit and radicalize their members.  The Al Muhajiroun 
movement case study was a prime example of this phenomenon. 
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 The Al Muhajiroun movement sought to mobilize British Muslims to support its 
own political agenda.  The Al Muhajiroun movement is a radical movement that 
advocates the use of violence.  Thus, it is not a step too far for some of its members, or 
members of other radical groups for that matter, to literally take up arms in pursuit of 
their goals. The Al Muhajiroun movement seeks to exploit cognitive openings to steer 
would be recruits toward their cause.  They then demand high levels of involvement for 
their members that accelerates the socialization process, which in turn fosters their 
members’ further radicalization as they increasingly identify with the group rather than as 
individuals.  
Al Muhajiroun was able to operate because it provided legitimate educational 
services and British elites remained divided as to what to do about groups like Al 
Muhajiroun.  On the one hand, these radical Islamic groups provided legitimate services 
to their communities. On the other hand, they espoused radical ideals.  Thus, because the 
British public and officials were divided as to what to do about these groups, they were 
allowed to operated and build formal and informal networks within Britain that facilitated 
the radicalization process.   
 The 7/7, 7/21 and airline plot terrorists all followed a similar pattern that roughly 
mirrored the radicalization/mobilization process outlined in the discussion of the Al 
Muhajiroun movement.  In fact, there was a striking similarity between how one Al 
Muhajiroun activist described his joining of that movement and the radicalization of 
Siddique Khan, the leader of the 7/7 bombers.  Each terrorist experienced a cognitive 
opening that was exploited by the messages of radical Islam.  In some cases, it was a 
radical friend associated with a larger organization, or an organization alone, that fostered 
radicalization. Their grievances varied even within terrorist groups.  Some members cited 
Iraq as their reason for radicalization and others 9/11.  Some members radicalized in the 
1990s and others after 9/11.  It took the presence of radical organizations to shape these 
various motivations into the terrorist plots outlined above.  
 It was the presence of radical Islamic political groups and charities played a key 
role for most of the terrorists in the case studies.  Without these groups, these young men 
may not have turned to terrorism. Because these groups and networks were present, the 
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radicalization path was facilitated and accelerated. These groups provided the 
mobilization and framing that took advantage of the young Muslims grievances.  
Through the subtle process of radicalization these young men turned to violence and 
ultimately terrorism.  It is the presence of these radical Islamic political and charitable 




A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will discuss French Muslims and why they, largely, have not turned 
to terrorism or even radicalization.  This chapter will show that the French government 
understood that, given the poor social and economic position of its Muslim immigrant 
population, French Muslims could provide a fertile recruiting ground for radical 
Islamists.  The French government took proactive steps through the promotion of Muslim 
civic organizations, beginning in the 1990s.  These steps, along with the state policy of 
laicite, a strong French version of the separation between the state and religion, helped 
reduce the political opportunities for radical Islamists.  Instead, a situation was created in 
which there were extremely limited political opportunities for radical groups to operate. 
It is the argument of this chapter that the opportunities for radical Islamists to 
operate do not exist in France to the same level that they do in Britain.  France has, due to 
its history has taken an aggressive approach toward discouraging the development of 
radical Islam within its borders.  It has developed a counter terrorism force that heavily 
monitors and infiltrates potential radical Islamic groups.  In addition, the Islamic political 
groups that do exist within France are largely subservient to the French state.  The Union 
of Islamic Organizations of France is a good example of this tendency toward 
subservience in the Islamic parties.  As the case of the 2005 riots will show, the Islamic 
political groups that do exist in France are so heavily identified with the state that many 
of the rioters lashed out at them as well as the French state. 
The riots of 2005 were the result of economic and social problems that plague the 
largely Muslim slums that surround some large French cities such as Paris, Lyon and 
Marseilles.  The riots can be seen as analogous to the Los Angeles riots following the 
Rodney King incident.  They were the result of large portions of the French Muslim 
youth reacting against what they perceive as state oppression and discrimination.  The 
riots were an expression of social and economic frustration not political grievances.  The 
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Muslim political parties in France could only attempt to stop the violence.  They did not 
have the organizational or framing tools necessary to shape the conflict. 
In the end, it will be shown that the difference between Britain and France lies 
primarily in the level of political opportunities available to radical groups.  France largely 
denies opportunities for radical Islamic groups to operate, much less influence a 
significant portion of the population.  Thus, the level of radicalization is significantly 
lower in France.  French Muslims are not without their social and economic grievances, 
but as was stated earlier this is insufficient without the political opportunities to organize 
and mobilize support for radical causes. 
B. FRENCH MUSLIM CONDITIONS 
The social and economic position of the French Muslim population is 
significantly lower than that of the rest of France.   France has about five million persons 
of Muslim origin, which is about 10 percent of the population which are concentrated the 
three large French cities of Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles.  Because they are concentrated in 
major urban centers, French Muslims are an extremely visible minority, despite only 
being around 10 percent of the population.  French Muslims are twice as likely as the 
general population to be unemployed.173  Even when education and skill levels are 
factored in (many Muslim immigrants came to France as low or unskilled labor), French 
Muslims are twice as likely to be unemployed.174  Due to the high levels of 
unemployment and concentration of immigrants, something like a ghetto phenomenon 
has developed in the areas where French Muslims live.175  These areas are in the suburbs 
of the major cities and are called the banlieues. 
Azouz Begag, a former researcher at the Centre national de la recherché 
scientifique and former Minister for Equal Opportunities in France describes three phases 
                                                 
173 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse. Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in 
Contemporary France (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2006), 32. 
174 Ibid., 33. 
175 Ibid., 36. 
 55
of the ghettoization of French Muslim banlieues: indifference, frustration, and rage.176 
The first phase occurred during the boom years and height of immigration, from 1945-
1975.  During this phase, Muslim immigrants were brought in to help alleviate the labor 
shortage, often living in shantytowns or temporary housing set up on the outskirts of the 
cities.  The second phase occurred once the economy contracted and the poor areas that 
housed the immigrant labor sunk even further into poverty, as the unemployment rate 
went up and blame was placed on them for taking jobs.  Indeed, it was during this time 
that Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National Party grew in popularity.  Its platform of anti-
immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric has only gained electoral support since the 
1980s.177  The third phase, the phase of rage, occurred in the 1990s when young Muslim 
children of the immigrants vented their anger at a system that excluded them and kept 
them mired in poverty.  The crime rate throughout France rose, especially in and around 
the banlieues, during this time.178  The three phases illustrate the historical roots of some 
of the frustration that modern French Muslim feel. 
The situation within the banlieues perfectly illustrates the situation for a most 
French Muslims. The banlieues are dominated by public housing.  By way of 
comparison, 17 percent of the general population lives in public housing while greater 
than a third, and in the case of North African immigrants up to half, live in public 
housing.179  This concentration of people in isolation from the rest of the society, through 
unemployment and discrimination has fostered gang culture and protest culture as a 
reaction.180  Begag has characterized this evolving gang culture as one that is completely 
isolated from politics and their ethnic group.  Instead, because of the social and economic 
isolation they experience, they identify more with their specific neighborhood and age 
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group.181  These youth are “hollowed out” to the point where they no longer feel multiple 
identities; they only identify with their specific neighborhood or even building.182 
Despite these social and economic issues, French Muslims seem to feel more 
integrated than their British coreligionists.  According to the Pew Research Center, 
French Muslims are split nearly evenly on whether or not they identify more with their 
religion or with their country of residence.183  In contrast, 81 percent of British Muslims 
identified first with their religion.  Furthermore, nearly 80 percent of French Muslims 
want to be a part of French society through the adoption of French customs.184  As 
Laurence and Vaisse point out, poll after poll show French Muslims seeking integration 
and expressing confidence in the French government.185  In order to determine how on 
the one hand French Muslims can experience such poor economic and social outcomes 
and yet express confidence in integration and the French state, a look at the French policy 
of laicite must be taken. 
The French policy of laicite can be compared to the American policy of 
separation of church and state.  Yet for the French it means much more.  According to 
Fetzer and Soper, laicite comes in a soft and hard variety.186  The hard laicite variety 
holds that religion should be completely banned from public life.  This means public 
officials should keep their religion out of politics and no public space should incorporate 
religious symbols.  The soft version of laicite holds that the state should be impartial with 
respect to religion and should only encourage free expression of religion.  Generally, 
laicite has meant that in France little to no accommodation is made for religious groups 
outside of certain narrow accommodations such as prison and military chaplaincies. 
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Religion, in general, is not popular in France as due to the influence of laicite and a 
national political culture that believes religion is dangerous in the political sphere.187 
The role of religion in French society also reflects that of French Muslims, who 
are generally Muslim in name only.  Although French Muslims are more likely to 
practice their faith than the Catholic majority, there have been increasing trends toward 
secularization. 188  Thus, according to social movement theory, not only would potential 
radicals have to contend with a political culture that is hostile toward religion in general, 
but also an increasingly secularized Muslim minority that is more concerned with 
economic matters than those of concern to radical Muslims.  Any radical Muslim group, 
if it was allowed to operate, would have a difficult time framing its message in such a 
way that it resonates with the concerns of French Muslims.  It is important therefore to 
look at how the Muslim political organizations within France work within the French 
political system, especially in light of laicite. 
C. UNION DES ORGANISATIONS ISLAMIQUES DE FRANCE (UNION OF 
ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS OF FRANCE) 
 One of the most prominent French Muslim organizations is the Union des 
Organisations Islamiques de France (Union of Islamic Organizations of France) (UOIF). 
As Laurence and Vaisse describe the UOIF, it is one of the main grassroots forces in 
contemporary French Islam.189  The UOIF has struggled in recent years due to its pursuit 
of a “clientist” strategy of seeking state recognition and by joining the French Counsel of 
the Muslim Religion, one of the main bodies through which the French state interacts 
with its Muslim citizens.190  Despite this, the UOIF still encompasses about 250 Muslim 
civil society and economic associations in France and exercises control over about 13.5 
percent of prayer spaces in France and even has its own theological seminary in  
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Burgundy.   Due to its size as well as its visibility, it is important to study the role that the 
UOIF plays within French Muslim society, much in the same way that the Al Muhajiroun 
Movement was studied in Britain. 
 The UOIF was founded in 1983 as a counterweight to the heavy influence, at that 
time, of the Great Mosque of Paris, which was still the primary focus of French 
government interaction with its Muslim population.  It is seen by many as the “Moroccan 
axis” to the Great Mosque’s Algerian axis.191  The UOIF gained considerable attention in 
1989 when it provided legal council to several of the young Muslim girls who were 
expelled for wearing headscarves to school.  At that time, it was the main voice of protest 
against the government’s plan to ban the headscarf from French Schools.  
 Currently the UOIF is known mainly for its annual gathering of French Muslims. 
The UOIF began its annual conference on Muslim life in France in the 1980s and has 
seen attendance grow to as large as 30,000 in 2005.192  This conference regularly 
addresses issues of concern to French Muslims such as discrimination and support for the 
Palestinian cause.  The UOIF is particularly known for its influence with the Muslim 
youth of France through various affiliated organizations like the Young Muslims of 
France and Muslim Students of France. 
 The main sources of controversy regarding the UOIF are the level of its foreign 
funding and its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.  It is unknown whether or not the 
organization receives one-third or two-thirds of its funding from overseas, but its leaders 
have nevertheless publicly expressed a desire to decrease the level of foreign funds.193 
The UOIF has also sought to downplay any relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
its leadership has even stated, with respect to the relation between Islamic and French 
law, “No one can say that religious law is comparable to the law of the Republic.”194 
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 The UOIF is clearly important as an organization, but it is also important for what 
it represents with respect to this paper’s argument.  The UOIF represents one of several 
Muslim organizations that are more or less unified at the national level through the 
French Counsel for the Muslim Religion.195  The French Counsel for the Muslim 
Religion acts as the overall elective body that represents the French Muslim polity within 
the French Republic. 
 The French state has taken a very activist role with respect to its Muslim 
population. It was the state that first began organizing French Muslims politically in 
1990.196  These efforts would later coalesce into what became the French Counsel for the 
Muslim Religion in 2003. Participation among the French Muslim population in the 
elections to the French Counsel for the Muslim Religion is very high with 80 percent of 
Muslim attendees at places of worship participating in the elections in 2003.197 
 It is this participation in a structure created and integrated within the state, along 
with the French laicite ideal, that has largely moderated French Muslim views.  As is 
clear above, the UOIF has expressed itself as simply representative body and not as a 
movement per se.  The large French Muslim bodies are concerned mainly with garnering 
votes within the representative counsel.  Indeed French Muslims channel many of their 
complaints with the French state through the national representative body.198  Moreover, 
in a poll taken in 2005, over 55 percent of French Muslims expressed confidence in the 
abilities of the French Counsel for the Muslim Religion to act as the Muslim 
community’s advocate.199 
 Thus, French Muslims may have considerable opportunities to interact with the 
state; the French government has expressly encouraged such interaction, but the political 
opportunity to mobilize support for radical groups does not exist. The various Muslim 
representative bodies are mainly designed to address religious and political concerns, 
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within the laicite framework. These groups are the ones that are proscribed and permitted 
to speak for French Muslims. Thus, there is a constraint upon the development of any 
additional parties, radical or otherwise. In this sense, the political opportunities radical 
groups would need, as per social movement theory, do not exist. There are no elite allies 
to draw from for radical Islamists as the elites have been co-opted by the French state.  
Indeed, any radical parties that do form must work within the moderating framework of 
the French Counsel for the Muslim Religion. Even if a radical Islamist group were to 
develop, it would have to operate within a national political framework that discourages 
overt appeals to religion; if anything, it severely restricts the role of religion in politics. 
 Yet, as one French Muslim journalist put it, “For most young people, the religious 
[and political] question is of secondary importance; their principle desire is for social and 
economic integration.”200  While groups like the UOIF acting through the French 
Counsel for the Muslim Religion act as guides to French Muslims’ political aspirations, 
the main source of discontent for the French Muslim population remains social and 
economic.  This discontent was to play itself out in the 2005 riots that swept France in the 
fall of that year.  The Muslim political organizations were powerless to repress the rage, 
and in fact were, in many cases, victims of it themselves. 
D. 2005 RIOTS 
On October 27, two French Muslim youth were electrocuted after fleeing from an 
identity checkpoint in a Paris suburb.  Their deaths caused nearly three weeks of violence 
throughout France.  The violence was to total over 200 million Euros, with nearly 9,000 
cars burned and over 2900 people arrested.  The rioters were primarily unemployed 
French Muslim youth from the banlieues.  In the aftermath of the riots, two main themes 
erupted as to what caused them: the riots were “the French Intifada”; the riots were the 
result of the frustration felt by French Muslims with their social and economic 
position.201 
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The conclusion that the riots were some sort of Muslim Intifada has been roundly 
rejected by most scholars, even though its power as an explanation continues in popular 
culture.  As Vaisse of the Brookings Institute noted, the only thing Islam had to do with 
the riots was that the primary perpetrators of the violence happened to be Muslim.202 
Indeed the Muslim rioters were enacting a decades old form of protest by burning cars. 
This lack of an Islamic presence was even more noticeable when it came to groups like 
the UOIF. The UOIF issued a fatwa to end the violence on November 6, 2005.  This 
fatwa met with little success, as the riots were to continue for another two weeks. 
Over the last 30 years French protestors, especially those from the banlieues have 
burned cars as symbols of the social mobility denied to them.203  Prior to the riots there 
were over 98,000 cars burned throughout France.204  In Strasbourg, France, several cars 
are burned every New Years Eve.  In this sense, the violence surrounding the riots in 
2005 was unique if only for its intensity. 
Indeed, there was almost no agenda to the violence at all, other than frustration at 
the social and economic position of many Muslims.  As Begag stated, very few of the 
rioters were in contact with the press at all.205  This was due to the fact that many French 
journalists lacked contacts within the banlieues, in addition to the fact that many young 
French Muslims were poorly educated and lacked the training, experience and leadership 
with which to articulate a set of demands.206  According to Begag, the rioters were 
expressing their frustration with discrimination and a lack of opportunities.  As 
Hargreaves puts it, “These ritualized attacks on automobiles, symbols of the social 
mobility denied to inhabitants of the banlieues, and on police forces seen as  
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representatives of an exclusionary social order are symptoms of deep-seated problems 
which have been festering for decades, above all poverty, unemployment and widespread 
ethnic discrimination.”207  
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the 2005 riots was that the 
violence illustrated the lack of political opportunities for radical Islamic groups.  When 
mainstream groups like the UOIF tried to intervene to stop the violence they were 
ignored.  The rioters’ primary concern, which is reflected by the general grievances of 
French Muslims, was economic and social discrimination.  If ever there were an instance 
in which a radical Islamic group could make inroads within the French Muslim youth, it 
would have been during the riots.  This did not happen, in part due to the fact that there 
were no radical groups present to take advantage of this opportunity, as well as little 
political room within which additional parties could act.  The French Counsel of the 
Muslim Religion essentially monopolized all political space for Muslim parties in France. 
Thus, any radicals would have to contend with an established political order, but also 
with a general hostility toward religious, never mind radical, parties.  It was also due to 
the robust French counterterrorism structures, which will be discussed in the next section.  
E. FRENCH COUNTERTERRORISM 
 Part of the reason France has not seen a terrorist attack in over a decade is due to 
the experience of its counterterrorism system.208  During the 1980s, France experienced a 
wave of state sponsored terrorism.  Groups such as Abu Nadal and Hizballah were active 
in France during this time.  Hizballah alone conducted 13 attacks during this period. 
During the 1990s, terrorist groups began recruiting young, alienated French Muslim 
youth in the suburbs.209  This was seen as especially dangerous, especially after the 
Algerian military annulled the 1991 election when it appeared that Islamists were to win.  
The former colony received the support of France, which, in turn, caused France to be a 
prime target for groups like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).  The GIA targeted 
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foreigners in Algeria, especially French, during its campaign of terror. It also brought 
terrorism to France with the attack on the Paris Metro in 1995.   
 France learned during the 1980s and 1990s how to combat international terrorism.  
As Shapiro and Suzan put it, France was a haven for terrorism during the 1980s and 
1990s.210  By the 1990s, France had learned enough to prevent planned attacks on the 
World Cup, the Strasbourg Cathedral and on the U.S. embassy.  France learned, long 
before 9/11, that Islamic terrorism was international and that its own Muslim youth could 
be exploited in the struggle.211 
 The French government’s philosophy when it comes to counterterrorism has been 
one of delegitimization.212  It believes that terror should be treated as a criminal matter in 
order to avoid treating terrorism as an act of war.  It simply views it as a violent form of 
extremism, regardless of the motivating factor.  This is especially true since France has 
been exposed to a variety of terrorisms, from separatists in Corsica, to leftists during the 
1970s and 1980s, to modern Islamic extremists.  France did not always see terrorism or 
terrorists in this way, but during the 1980s and 1990s it decided that its previous policy of 
accommodation needed to change to one of suppression.213 
 In the 1980s, steps were taken to combat terrorism by creating many units to 
oversee counterterrorism efforts and coordinate responses.  France centralized how it 
adjudicated terrorist cases as well, based on the lessons it learned in the 1960s.  During 
the Algerian war of independence, France set up a separate court system made up of 
military officers, which came to be seen by many as a tool of repression.214  In 1986, 
France created a system for dealing with terrorism that left prosecution and adjudication 
within the regular legal system but allowed for longer sentences, based on the unique 
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nature of terrorism.215 France also uses a law that makes it a crime to be associated in any 
way with a terrorist plot, no matter how remote the association.  It is also a crime to 
intend to commit a crime. Clearly, the powers of the French legal system are far reaching 
when it comes to dealing with terrorism. 
 Even with the far reaching laws, what has made France’s counterterrorism efforts 
truly effective has been the proactive and flexible response that it has been able to mount 
against modern terrorist networks.  French counter-terror agents are given wide latitude 
to infiltrate and even incite groups, which is legal if it is done in order to prevent larger 
terrorist acts.216  In addition, the judicial magistrates work closely with intelligence and 
police agencies and over time have developed relationships that have yielded 
considerable results.217  The French population also is fully supportive of measures that 
would be seen as violations of civil rights in the United States and Britain.218  Indeed the 
French public, having spent decades coping with the threat of terrorism, see terrorism as 
something to be managed and not solved.219  This provides the French government with 
wide latitude to manage its struggle against terrorism.  
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the conditions of French Muslims and provided insight 
into why there has been no significant turn to terrorism by the French Muslim population. 
French Muslims experience significant levels of economic and social exclusion from 
mainstream French society.  This exclusion is accompanied by a level of support for the 
French government and system that is not seen in Britain, however.  In many ways, the 
situation for many French Muslims is bad enough that they have become depoliticized 
and intensely micro-territorial, as was shown with the gang mentality in the banlieues.  It 
was also shown that, beside the lack of a fertile recruiting ground, radical Islamist groups 
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would have to contend with a heavily secular society and a Muslim society that is also 
secular or at the very least tending toward secularism.  
 French Muslim parties also contribute to the lack of terrorism.  French Muslim 
political parties are heavily dependent upon and subservient to the French state.  When 
the riots took place in 2005 they were utterly powerless to shape, much less hinder the 
outbreak of violence.  For that matter, the riots of 2005 go further to show that the 
primary concern and focus of French Muslim grievances is in the social and economic 
realms. There exist, in the parlance of social movement theory, little mobilization 
potentialities in France. 
 France, by co-opting the Muslim parties that do exist within the French Counsel 
of the Muslim Religion, essentially shut the door to radical groups.  Any new Muslim 
parties would be subject to intra-community competition from the start, which would 
moderate their views. Additionally, French society would be loath to sanction or tolerate 
any radical groups operating outside the established framework. 
 If this were not enough to discourage radical Islamist from operating, the French 
have developed a flexible and proactive counterterrorism system that has considerable 
powers when it comes to dealing with and preventing terrorism.  France developed this 
system over years of dealing with many varieties of terrorism. 
 What this shows is that there is little political opportunity for Islamic radicals to 
operate in France.  The French Muslim population is more concerned about local 
economic and social matters to get involved with, or relate to, the global struggles of 
Islamic extremism.  The French Muslim parties, who do command the support of many 
French Muslims, even if, as was shown with the 2005 riots, they are sometimes 
ineffective, are solidly mainstream in their politics. Combine this with the national 
ideology of laicite, and the result is a lack of political opportunities for radical Islamic 
groups to exploit.  Additionally, should Islamic groups find it possible to operate in 
France, they would eventually face the French counterterrorism apparatus.  This 













This thesis looked at four possible explanations of Muslim radicalization in 
Europe: cultural irreconcilability, internal grievances, external conflicts, and social 
movement theory.  The cultural theory argued that Islam itself was the source of 
radicalization in Europe, but the cases of Britain and France cast doubt on this theory 
because, in each country the views of Muslims with respect to the role of Islam in society 
is different.  As was pointed out, when Muslims migrated to Britain they brought with 
them a very conservative outlook toward Islam and the state, while French Muslims from 
North Africa were far more secular.  In this sense, it was not Islam but the attitude toward 
its role in society that mattered.  Moreover, many of the terrorists turned to terrorism 
through Islam, but it was a highly political and radicalized form of Islam. French 
Muslims when they rioted were rioting based on social and economic issues. Islam 
played no role other than serving as a general identifier of the rioters.  When religious 
groups tried to intervene, they were ignored.  Thus radical Islam does exert some 
influence but it is not sufficient to explain the differences between Britain and France. 
This thesis also looked at internal grievances as a source for the differences 
between Britain and France.  To a significant extent, both Muslim populations 
experienced social and economic estrangement from mainstream British and French 
society.  The idea that internal grievances alone explain the difference partially explains 
why French Muslims rioted in 2005, but it does not explain British terrorists who often 
cited external reasons for justification.  Therefore, internal grievances can only partially 
explain the differences between Britain and France. 
External factors were also discussed throughout this thesis.  For British Muslims 
they played a much more significant role, if statements of the terrorists themselves are to 
be taken seriously.  External factors do seem to go a long way in explaining the 
differences between the two countries.  Britain was closely allied with the United States 
during the war in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq.  Several terrorists in Britain identified 
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9/11 and/or Iraq as their motivation for joining radical circles.  France, on the other hand, 
participated only in the war on terror and took a visible role in opposing the Iraq war. On 
the surface, this argument could provide some explanatory power for the differences 
between the two countries.  Yet, it was shown that in many cases in Britain the 
radicalization process occurred well before these events.  It was also unclear how 
significant these events were as often the radicalization of British Muslims was due in 
large part to the social circles in which terrorists participated.  In other words, outside 
factors could have played a precipitant cause that only furthered the radicalization already 
taking place.  External factors only partially explain the differences. 
Social movement theory, which argues that political opportunities shape the 
mobilization of aggrieved people based on a theme or set of themes that resonate with the 
aggrieved citizens, provides the most comprehensive framework for evaluating the 
findings of this thesis.  Social movement theory is careful to point out that grievances, 
whether internal or external to a state, are only part of the explanation for why people 
mobilize.  Grievances are simply not sufficient for people to become mobilized on a 
consistent basis.  If grievances alone were sufficient, then those who hold that Islam is 
incompatible with the West and that conflicts in the Middle East drive much of the 
Muslim radicalism in Europe would have a much better case and there would be regular, 
spontaneous protests against alleged affronts to Muslim dignity.  Instead, political 
organizations must mobilize people using other themes, beside the alleged affront to 
Muslim dignity.  Indeed social movement theory also accounts for how Islam can be used 
as a motivating factor.  In this respect, it does account for Islam playing a role in the 
radicalization of European Muslims.  Religion, in this case Islam, is a powerful theme 
that can unite and mobilize people, provided it resonates with people personally.  
Social movement theory therefore is a much better frame for determining what 
may lie behind the differences between British and French Muslim populations.  It 
incorporates many of the elements of the other theories into a coherent, dynamic whole.  




opportunity and resources for organizing exists in a much greater degree in British 
Muslims than it does in French Muslims.  This accounts for the difference in mobilization 
outcomes between the two countries. 
The cases of Britain and France led credence to this approach because it was 
shown that, in each case study of terrorists operating in Britain, it was the presence of a 
radical group or charity that helped foster the radicalization of British Muslims.  The Al 
Muhajiroun movement was used as an example of a radical Islamist organization 
operating more or less openly in Britain.  Al Muhajiroun was able to capitalize on the 
concerns of British Muslims to recruit individuals.  As people became members of Al 
Muhajiroun, the organization made increasing demands on their time that increasingly 
socialized the members toward the Al Muhajiroun’s radical agenda.  Thus, Al 
Muhajiroun is a good example of how social movement theory can explain why British 
Muslims turned to terrorism and French Muslims did not. 
Al Muhajiroun was allowed for over ten years to operate openly in Britain, 
despite its radical rhetoric.  It openly advocated violence and supported radical Muslim 
causes worldwide.  Due to divided elite attitudes and poor counterterrorism enforcement, 
it was able to capitalize on the grievances of the British Muslim population because it 
was given the political opportunity to operate.  It brought members into its fold by 
tailoring its message in a way that resonated with prospective members individually.  It 
then radicalized them.  In this sense, it provides the template for the other British cases 
British Muslims came to radicalization through organizations such as Al 
Muhajiroun.  In the case of the 7/7 bombers, it was Khan who helped radicalize the other 
members of his terrorist cell.  Yet it was also shown that Islamist networks were assessed 
to play a part in the 7/7 bombers radicalization.  This was true also of the 7/21 bombers. 
They too had ties to radical organizations through radical mosques. The Transatlantic 
Bombing plot also showed ties to radical Islamic groups. In each case it was the presence 
of the radical organizations that helped foster and encourage terrorism.   
The British government realized too late that it had a problem within its borders 
due to the ability of radical groups to operate more or less openly. Because British society 
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saw some of the activities of the radical groups as legitimate and because elites remained 
divided as to the proper course, if any, to take regarding the suppression of these radical 
groups, a political opportunity existed for radical groups like Al Muhajiroun to exploit. 
The exploitation of this opportunity created  further opportunities as informal networks 
were created centered on these formal radical groups. The result was a large network of 
radicals that made it difficult for British counterterrorist forces to combat. 
In France there were virtually no radical groups openly operating.  In addition, the 
political culture in France had, for years, shaped political Islam into a force subservient to 
the state.  Thus any grievances that the French Muslims felt, whether internal or external, 
were channeled into Muslim political groups, which were already part of the French 
political structure.  In other words, regardless of the level of grievances in France, French 
Muslims had no ability to mobilize in response.  The 2005 riots only proved this point. 
The 2005 riots were a spontaneous, unorganized response to the death of fellow 
banlieues residents.  When French Muslim groups tried to shape and reduce the violence, 
they were met with derision by the protestors.  The riots were a response to decades of 
economic and social exclusion, not to political issues.  Given the overwhelmingly 
political nature of terrorism, this is a significant point of difference between Britain and 
France. For many French Muslims their grievances are not seen as political in nature. 
Thus, even if radical groups were to exist in France, they would face an uphill battle in 
finding a theme that would resonate with the French Muslim population. 
This too holds with the predictions of social movement theory.  Social movement 
theory holds that even if organizations and political opportunities exist, it is highly 
unlikely a movement will sustain itself if its message does not resonate.  Part of the 
explanation for the difference between Britain and France is also this lack of theme 
resonance.  
In reviewing the British and French case studies, several things become clear.  It 
is clear that social movement theory provides the best overall explanation for the 
differences in outcomes between British and French Muslim populations.  It is also clear 
that at the root of the differences between the populations are the political opportunities 
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that were available to radical Muslim groups to utilize.  It is also clear that there was a 
significant lack of theme resonance for French Muslims, which also contributed to the 
difference in outcomes. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATION 
The most obvious result of this study is that by reducing political opportunities, 
through robust counter terror regimes and state influence over Muslim political groups, 
states can reduce terrorism.  This conclusion must be tempered however.  The kinds of 
counter terror policies enacted in France would hardly be tolerated in the United States, 
where they would be seen as violations of civil rights.220  The level of grievances within 
the United States’ Muslim population is considerably lower than that in Europe.221  The 
circumstances of the American Muslim population are considerably different from their 
coreligionists in Europe.  American Muslims economically are comparable if not better 
off than mainstream American society.  Nevertheless, radicalization remains a problem in 
the United States.222 
The lesson that should be drawn is that policy makers should reduce the political 
opportunities through careful consideration of the unique situation of their Muslim 
populations.  They should do this in a way that discourages radicalism while not singling 
out Muslims per se.  As was shown above, the constant grouping of Muslims together as 
a monolithic block and treating radicalism as a Muslim problem tends to create the very 
problem policy makers are trying to avoid.  Instead, policy makers should encourage a 
political discourse that discourages these groups from operating and reduces the frame 
resonance among their Muslim population.  Mainstream groups that denounce violence 
should be encouraged.  Yet policy makers should recognize that the radicalization 
process is a varied one that eludes precise policy proscriptions.  Thus, law enforcement 
and counterterrorism agencies should be given the flexibility and tools necessary to 
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proactively go after the problem.  Reacting to the problem after it has already had time to 
develop, as was the case with Britain only leads to worse problems later. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The research in this study can be enhanced in several ways.  Utilizing social 
movement theory, scholars should broaden the comparative study undertaken here to 
determine if the conclusions reached within this theses hold.  A comparative study of 
multiple European countries would be beneficial as well as a study comparing the 
Muslim populations of Canada and the United States.  These comparative studies would 
help determine if political opportunities are what, more often than not, determine the 
level of terrorism in a given society. 
Additionally scholars should consider interviewing those that have left terrorist 
groups to determine what factors led them to do so.  In this way the question of whether 
or not state policies are affecting the choices of would-be terrorists to continue with a 
radical organization or leave it entirely.  Jacobson’s study of terrorist dropouts, Terrorist 
Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left, is a step in the right direction.223 
Scholars should build upon his work and analyze country-specific dropouts to determine 
if state policies are effective. 
In the final analysis, it is important for scholars and policy makers alike to 
recognize that state policy can have a significant impact on whether or not an 
environment conducive for the development of terrorism develops within their borders. 
The transnational threat of terrorism is real, but more often than not terrorists build on 
local opportunities and grievances.  By determine the level and nature of government 
policy effect in this realm, better policies can be developed that discourage the 
development of terrorism. 
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